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The Production Gap
The discrepancy between countries’ 
planned fossil fuel production and 
global production levels consistent 





The first Production Gap Report was launched in November 2019 by leading research institutions 
and experts, in collaboration with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Modelled after UNEP’s 
Emissions Gap Report series — and conceived as a complementary analysis — the Production 
Gap Report conveys the large discrepancy between countries' planned fossil fuel production and 
the global production levels necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C and 2°C. 
This year’s report comes as the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting lockdown measures impact 
societies — and their use and production of coal, oil, and gas — in unprecedented ways. The 
context for fossil fuel production is thus changing rapidly. Governments are pouring money into 
their economies, taking on increasing debt, and even changing environmental regulations in a bid 
to respond and recover from the pandemic’s economic and social fall-out. This could have lasting 
consequences for the nature and speed of transitions away from fossil fuels — and, consequently, 
for the production gap.
This year’s report is a special issue that considers the production gap in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic. It recognizes that the world is still at a potential turning point towards a healthier and 
more resilient, low-carbon future. It considers government responses to the COVID-19-induced 
crisis and the implications of those responses for the production gap. It includes an interim update 
of the production gap, while acknowledging the current uncertainty of long-term government plan-
ning amid the focus on near-term solutions to the COVID-19 crisis. Next year, the 2021 Production 
Gap Report will include a broader assessment of the production gap, including the country profiles 
that were a centrepiece of the 2019 report.
This report represents a collaboration of many research and academic institutions and experts. 
UNEP staff provided guidance and insights from their experience leading other gap reports. The 
report relies on publicly accessible government plans and projections for fossil fuel production, 
and other publicly available government, intergovernmental, and research sources, as cited and 
listed in the references.
This document may be cited as: SEI, IISD, ODI, E3G, and UNEP. (2020). The Production Gap Report: 2020 Special Report. 
http://productiongap.org/2020report
Photo Credits
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Carbon entanglement
The process by which government dependence on fossil fuel 
extraction creates heavily vested interests in bringing fossil 
fuels to market that stand in the way of progress in climate 
policy (Gurría 2013).
Carbon lock-in
The tendency for certain carbon-intensive technological systems 
to persist over time, “locking out” lower-carbon alternatives, 
owing to a combination of linked technical, economic, and  
institutional factors. These technologies may be costly to build, 
but relatively inexpensive to operate (Erickson et al. 2015).
Extraction-based emissions accounting
An accounting framework that attributes greenhouse gas 
emissions from the burning of fossil fuels to the location of 
fuel extraction.
Fossil fuel production
A collective term used in this report to represent processes 
along the fossil fuel supply chain, which includes locating, 
extracting, processing, and delivering coal, oil, and gas to 
consumers.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs)
Atmospheric gases that absorb and emit infrared radiation, 
trap heat, contribute to the greenhouse effect, and cause 
global warming. The principal GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), as well as hydroflu-
orocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6).
Just transition
In the context of climate policy, this refers to a shift to a 
low-carbon economy that ensures disruptions are minimized, 
and benefits maximized, for workers, communities, consum-
ers, and other stakeholders who may be disproportionately 
affected (ITUC 2017; UNFCCC 2016). 
Long-term low greenhouse gas emission develop-
ment strategies (LEDS)
Under the Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision, 
all countries are invited to communicate LEDS by 2020, 
taking into account their common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national 
circumstances.
Multilateral development bank (MDB)
An international financial institution chartered by multiple 
countries to support economic and social development in 
lower-income countries.
Nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
Submissions by Parties to the Paris Agreement that contain 
their stated ambitions to take climate change action towards 
achievement of the Agreement’s long-term goal of limiting 
global temperature increase to well below 2°C, while pursu-
ing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. Parties are requested 
to communicate new or updated NDCs by 2020 and every 
five years thereafter.
National fossil fuel production plans and projections
Fossil fuel production targets, plans, and projections drawn 
from national plans, strategy documents, and outlooks pub-
lished by governments and affiliated institutions.
Production gap
The discrepancy between countries' planned fossil fuel pro-
duction and global production levels consistent with limiting 
warming to 1.5°C or 2°C.
Resource curse
Refers to the fact that many resource-rich countries do not 
fully benefit from their natural resource wealth, and may in 
fact experience worse development and economic growth 
outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources (Sachs 
and Warner 1995).
Stranded assets
Assets that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs 
or downward revaluations, or that are converted to liabilities, 
as the result of a low-carbon transition or other environ-
ment-related risks (Ansar et al. 2013).
Subsidy
A financial benefit accorded to a specific interest (e.g. an 
individual, organization, company, or sector) by a government 
or public body.
Supply-side climate policy
Policies and measures aimed at regulating or managing the 
wind-down of, or transition away from, fossil fuel production.
Glossary
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APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Tcm   Trillion cubic meters
CCS  Carbon capture and storage
CDR   Carbon dioxide removal
CO2   Carbon dioxide
°C   Degree Celsius
EJ   Exajoule
EU  European Union
G20   Group of Twenty
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP  Gross domestic product
GHG   Greenhouse gas
GNI  Gross national income
Gt   Gigatonne (Billion tonnes)
IEA   International Energy Agency
IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LEDS  Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies
Mb/d   Million barrels per day
NDC   Nationally determined contribution
NOC  National oil company 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC   Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SDG   Sustainable Development Goal
SOE  State-owned enterprise
UAE  United Arab Emirates
UN  United Nations
UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC   UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UK  United Kingdom
US  United States
WTO   World Trade Organization
Abbreviations 
The Production Gap: 2020 Report     vii
Five years since the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, the 
world is still far from meeting 
its climate goals.
As last year’s Production Gap 
Report highlighted, this is in 
part due to the disconnect 
between climate and energy planning. Collectively, gov-
ernments are planning to produce more than twice the 
amount of fossil fuels by 2030 than would be compatible 
with a 1.5°C pathway, while channeling billions in public 
support to fossil fuel production and consumption.
Now, with governments injecting trillions into their econo-
mies, we find ourselves at a critical juncture where govern-
ment decisions can either further lock in fossil fuel energy 
systems or transition us to a cleaner and safer future.
This year’s devastating forest fires, floods, droughts, and 
other unfolding extreme weather events serve as pow-
erful reminders for why we must succeed in tackling the 
climate crisis. Investing instead in low-carbon energy and 
infrastructure is good for jobs, for economies, for health, 
and for clean air. 
Governments must seize the opportunity to direct their 
economies and energy systems away from fossil fuels, and 
build back better towards a more just, sustainable, and 
resilient future.
One year ago, the first 
Production Gap Report 
sounded the alarm on 
the disconnect between 
countries’ energy plans and 
climate commitments. It gave 
a name to the troubling trend 
of countries planning more and 
more fossil fuel production, even as they agreed to Paris 
Agreement goals that require far less.
Since then, the world has undergone enormous change. 
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to take lives and force 
unprecedented government action, and to hit already 
disadvantaged and vulnerable communities the hardest.
The world can and will recover. Government policies and 
spending priorities will determine whether that recovery 
leads to a healthy, resilient, and equitable future — one 
that avoids the severe climate disruption associated with 
unsustainable levels of fossil fuel production. 
This report points the way forward. It shines a light on 
how government action, in many cases, risks locking us 
into fossil-fuelled pathways. And it lays out the alternative, 
with solutions and examples for moving beyond coal, oil, 
and gas production. It’s time to imagine — and plan for — 
a better future.
Foreword





United Nations Environment Programme
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Executive Summary
To follow a 1.5°C-consistent 
pathway, the world will need to 
decrease fossil fuel production 
by roughly 6% per year between 
2020 and 2030.  
Countries are instead planning 
and projecting an average annual 
increase of 2%, which by 2030 
would result in more than double 
the production consistent with 
the 1.5°C limit.
Pre-COVID plans and post-COVID 
stimulus measures point to a 
continuation of the growing 
global fossil fuel production  
gap, locking in severe climate 
disruption.
To date, governments have 
committed far more COVID-19 
funds to fossil fuels than to  
clean energy. Policymakers  
must reverse this trend to  
meet climate goals.
Countries with lower 
dependence and higher financial 
and institutional capacity can 
undertake a just and equitable 
transition from fossil fuel 
production most rapidly, while 
those with higher dependence 
and lower capacity will require 
greater international support.
Policymakers can support a 
managed, just, and equitable 
wind-down of fossil fuel 
production through six areas  
of action.
Key Findings
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Executive Summary
To limit warming to 1.5°C or well below 2°C, as required by the 2015 Paris Agreement, the world 
needs to wind down fossil fuel production. Instead, governments continue to plan to produce coal, 
oil, and gas far in excess of the levels consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature limits.
This report highlights the discrepancy between countries’ 
planned fossil fuel production levels and the global levels 
necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. This gap is 
large, with countries aiming to produce 120% more fossil 
fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with limiting glob-
al warming to 1.5°C. 
The COVID-19 pandemic and associated response mea-
sures have introduced new uncertainties to the produc-
tion gap. While global fossil fuel production will decline 
sharply this year, government stimulus and recovery 
measures will shape our climate future: they could prompt 
a return to pre-COVID production trajectories that lock in 
severe climate disruption, or they could set the stage for a 
managed wind-down of fossil fuels as part of a “build back 
better” effort. 
This special issue of the Production Gap Report looks at 
how conditions have changed since last year, what this 
means for the production gap, and how governments can 
set the stage for a long-term, just, and equitable transition 
away from fossil fuels.
Figure ES.1
The fossil fuel production gap — the difference between national production plans and low-carbon (1.5°C and 2°C) pathways, as expressed 
in fossil fuel carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions — will continue to widen if countries return to their pre-COVID plans and projections for 
expanded fossil fuel production. Alternatively, strong green recovery efforts could put future fossil fuel production on a pathway much 
closer to Paris Agreement limits.
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The report’s main findings are as follows.
To follow a 1.5°C-consistent pathway, the world will need 
to decrease fossil fuel production by roughly 6% per year 
between 2020 and 2030. Countries are instead planning 
and projecting an average annual increase of 2%, which 
by 2030 would result in more than double the production 
consistent with the 1.5°C limit (Figure ES.1). 
Between 2020 and 2030, global coal, oil, and gas produc-
tion would have to decline annually by 11%, 4%, and 3%, 
respectively, to be consistent with a 1.5°C pathway. But 
government plans and projections indicate an average 2% 
annual increase for each fuel (Figure ES.2).
This translates to a production gap similar to 2019, with 
countries aiming to produce 120% and 50% more fossil 
fuels by 2030 than would be consistent with limiting glob-
al warming to 1.5°C or 2°C, respectively. 
However, the future of the production gap is subject to 
large uncertainties, as the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
ramifications on fossil fuel supply and demand continue 
to unfold. 
The COVID-19 pandemic — and the “lockdown” mea-
sures to halt its spread — have led to short-term drops 
in coal, oil, and gas production in 2020. But pre-COVID 
plans and post-COVID stimulus measures point to a 
continuation of the growing global fossil fuel production 
gap, locking in severe climate disruption.
Preliminary estimates suggest that global fossil fuel pro-
duction could decline by 7% in 2020; more specifically, 
coal, oil, and gas supply could decrease by 8%, 7%, and 
3%, respectively, in 2020 relative to 2019, primarily as a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown measures. 
But countries are still planning to produce far more fossil 
fuels by 2030 than consistent with limiting warming to 
1.5°C or 2°C. Of the eight governments that served as a 
basis for the 2019 production gap estimate (accounting 
for 60% of the global fossil fuel supply), seven have since 
updated their production plans and projections. Nearly all 
these updates occurred prior to the COVID-19 outbreak — 
and together, they pointed to a continuation of the very 
wide production gap.
In addition, before the COVID-19 outbreak, several coun-
tries not included in the gap analysis released or updat-
ed plans that point to intentions for major growth in oil 
production. For the 2020–2030 period, Mexico foresaw 
50% growth, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates each 
planned for a 70% increase, and Argentina aimed for a 
130% increase in oil production.
The 2021 Production Gap Report will include a more thor-
ough analysis of the gap. But so far, all indications are that, 
overall, governments are planning to expand fossil fuel 
production at a time when climate goals require that they 
wind it down. If governments continue to direct COVID-19 
recovery packages and stimulus funds to fossil fuels, 
these plans could become reality.
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Alternatively, governments could use the momentum to 
plan a “green” recovery with a deliberate and managed 
wind-down of fossil fuel production — one driven by cli-
mate concerns, new economic and employment opportu-
nities, and environmental and public health co-benefits. 
They could take the opportunity to begin a low-carbon 
transition, where fossil fuel production winds down in a 
sustainable and equitable way.
To date, governments have committed far more COVID-19 
funds to fossil fuels than to clean energy. Policymakers 
must reverse this trend to meet climate goals.
As of November 2020, G20 governments had committed 
USD 233 billion to activities that support fossil fuel pro-
duction and consumption (e.g. for airlines, car manufac-
turers, and fossil-based power consumers), as compared 
with USD 146 billion to renewable energy, energy effi-
ciency, and low-carbon alternatives such as cycling and 
pedestrian systems (Figure ES.3).
Of the support going to fossil fuels, USD 23 billion is 
support specific to fossil fuel production. Some of this 
is directed towards environmentally beneficial activities; 
Canada, for example, committed USD 1.8 billion towards 
methane emission reduction and the clean-up of or-
phaned and abandoned oil and gas wells.
However, the vast majority of this fossil fuel production 
support has lacked any social, economic, or environ-
mental conditions. Unconditional support to production 
includes tax cuts on fossil fuel exports in Argentina, 
equity and loan guarantees for the Keystone XL pipeline 
in Canada, a rebate on coal extraction revenue due to the 
government in India, a temporary tax relief package for 
the oil and gas industry in Norway, and reductions in oil 
and gas royalty rates and the weakening of environmental 
regulations in the United States.
In general, government responses to the COVID-19 crisis 
have tended to intensify patterns that existed prior to the 
pandemic: jurisdictions that already heavily subsidized 
the production of fossil fuels have increased this support, 
while those with stronger commitments to a transition 
to clean energy are now using stimulus and recovery 
packages to accelerate this shift. Unfortunately, most of 
the world’s major producing countries are in the former 
category; this needs to change, if the world is to meet 
climate goals.
Figure ES.2
Coal, oil, and gas production experienced short-term dips in 2020 amid COVID-19 restrictions. If countries rebound to the production 
indicated in their plans and projections, the production gap — shown here in energy and physical units — will grow most quickly for coal, 
but also rapidly for oil and gas.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a reminder of the 
importance of ensuring that a transition away from fossil 
fuels is just and equitable. Countries that are less depen-
dent on fossil fuel production and have higher financial 
and institutional capacity can transition most rapidly, 
while those with higher dependence and lower capacity 
will require greater international support.
The COVID-19 pandemic — and the associated disrup-
tion — provides a strong rationale for countries to  
cooperate to wind down fossil fuel production in a  
coordinated way that avoids and minimizes social costs 
and helps create market stability. Developing countries 
have borne the brunt of the fossil fuel industry’s fragility 
during the pandemic, with lost oil revenue, for example, 
driving a 25% cut in government spending in Nigeria, 
significantly reducing Iraq’s social benefits, and severely 
affecting Ecuador’s public sector.
But a just and equitable transition away from fossil fuels 
offers the potential for alternative high-quality jobs, 
improvements in public health, a re-envisioning of urban 
areas, and a refocusing of economic systems on human 
well-being and equitably shared prosperity. This requires 
recognizing that countries’ transitional challenges differ 
widely, depending on their level of dependence on fossil 
fuel production and their capacity to support a transition. 
Countries with limited capacity will need financial,  
technological, and capacity-building support from  
higher-capacity ones. 
Figure ES.3
COVID-19 recovery efforts in G20 countries have committed more public funds to fossil fuels than to clean energy, as of 11 November 2020, 
with significant differences by country (Energy Policy Tracker 2020). 
Public money commitments to fossil fuels, and 
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Policymakers can support a managed, just, and equita-
ble wind-down of fossil fuel production through six ar-
eas of action: sustainable stimulus and recovery packag-
es, increased support for just and equitable transitions, 
reduced support for fossil fuels, restrictions on produc-
tion, improved transparency, and global cooperation.
Six main areas of action for governments could help en-
sure a managed, just, and equitable transition away from 
fossil fuels that “builds back better” from the COVID-19 
pandemic:
1. Ensure COVID-19 recovery packages and economic 
stimulus funds support a sustainable recovery and 
avoid further carbon lock-in. Many countries have 
begun to make investments in areas such as renew-
able energy, energy efficiency, green hydrogen, and 
improved pedestrian infrastructure. But if this is 
accompanied by significant support for high-carbon 
industries, COVID-19 recovery measures still risk 
locking in high-carbon energy systems and develop-
ment pathways for decades into the future. Govern-
ments that choose to invest in high-carbon industries 
to boost economies and safeguard livelihoods in the 
short term — perhaps because they see few near-term 
alternatives — can nonetheless introduce conditions 
to that investment to promote long-term alignment with 
climate goals.
2. Provide local and international support to fossil-fuel- 
dependent communities and economies for diversi-
fication and just, equitable transitions. Each country 
and region faces unique challenges in a transition away 
from fossil fuels, depending on their dependence on 
production and their capacity to transition. Inclusive 
planning is essential, as is financial, technical, and 
capacity-building support for communities with limited 
financial and institutional capacity. 
3. Reduce existing government support for fossil fuels. 
Many long-standing forms of government support to 
fossil fuels — including consumer subsidies, producer 
subsidies, and public finance investment — stand in 
the way of a sustainable recovery to COVID-19 and 
need to be ended. 
4. Introduce restrictions on fossil fuel production 
activities and infrastructure. Restricting new fossil 
fuel production activities and infrastructure can avoid 
locking in levels of fossil fuel production higher than 
those consistent with climate goals. It can also reduce 
the risk of stranded assets and communities.
5. Enhance transparency of current and future fossil 
fuel production levels. A key barrier to aligning energy 
and climate plans is the lack of clarity on levels of fossil 
fuel production and planned or expected growth. To 
improve transparency, countries could ensure that 
relevant production data are more readily and publicly 
accessible. They can also provide information on how 
their fossil fuel production plans align with climate 
goals, and on their support to the production of fossil 
fuels. Governments can also take steps to disclose 
their level of exposure to fossil fuel asset stranding and 
associated systemic risk, and to require companies 
within their jurisdiction to do so.
6. Mobilize and support a coordinated global response. 
Policies to transition away from fossil fuels will be 
most effective if supported by countries collectively, as 
this will send consistent, directional signals to energy 
producers, consumers, and investors. International 
cooperation, both through established channels and in 
new forums, can support a just and equitable wind-
down of fossil fuels. The Paris Agreement’s global 
stocktake, nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 
and long-term low greenhouse gas emission develop-
ment strategies (LEDS) offer opportunities to facilitate 
a transition away from fossil fuel production through 
the UN climate change process. International financial 
institutions can help shift financial support away from 




The COVID-19 pandemic has 
demonstrated the importance of 
government intervention and 
international cooperation in 
reducing societal risk and 
mitigating collective threats, 
such as climate change.
The increased global  
production of fossil fuels  
is at odds with a climate- 
safe future. 
The risks of relying heavily on 
fossil fuel development for 
economic activity are numerous, 
including air and water pollution, 
increasing competition from 
other energy sources, and 
growing pressures to transition 
to low-carbon economies.
As countries recover and rebuild, 
governments face a choice: 
further lock societies and 
economies into a high-carbon 
system, or “build back better” 
towards a Paris-compatible, 
resilient future.
This report aims to equip 
policymakers with options to 
assess and guide the transition 
away from fossil fuel production, 
both in their COVID-19 recovery 
plans and beyond.
Key Messages
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The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the fragility of this 
fossil fuel dominance. Restrictions in economic and social 
activity and travel triggered the biggest shock to global 
fossil fuel consumption in seven decades (IEA, 2020d). 
Oil prices plunged — to historic lows in some places — 
and countries reliant on oil revenues found themselves 
saddled with additional hardships in the midst of a health 
crisis.
Now, with unprecedented investment in rescue and 
recovery packages — it has been estimated that coun-
tries will invest USD 10–20 trillion from mid-2020 through 
the end of 2021 (Assmann and Hastings 2020; McKinsey 
2020) — governments are making decisions that may set 
the course of their economies for years to come. Some 
are doubling down on fossil fuels, a path that carries large 
economic risks and disastrous environmental conse-
quences. Already, the extraction and burning of fossil 
fuels has contributed to air-pollution-related illnesses and 
deaths, intensifying extreme weather, and rising food and 
water insecurity worldwide (Field et al. 2014; Hoegh-Guld-
berg et al. 2018). 
Continued production of fossil fuels at current levels, 
let alone the increases envisioned by governments, is at 
odds with a climate-safe future. Coal, oil, and gas account 
for over three-fourths of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, including 90% of carbon dioxide emissions and 
roughly a third of methane emissions (IEA 2019; Jackson 
et al. 2020; SEI et al. 2019). 
Last year’s Production Gap Report found countries 
planned to produce fossil fuels far in excess of the levels 
necessary to limit global warming to 1.5°C or “well below” 
2°C, the temperature limits set out in the landmark Paris 
Agreement, which nearly all governments have now rati-
fied. One year later, the world has changed — but, so far, 
these plans have not. 
Limiting climate change impacts, and meeting Paris 
Agreement goals, requires that countries wind down 
fossil fuel production by 6% annually over the coming 
decade under a 1.5°C pathway and by 2% annually under 
a 2°C pathway (see Chapter 2). As countries recover and 
rebuild, a key question becomes: will they return to their 
previous trajectories, with plans to collectively produce 
far more coal, oil, and gas than is consistent with climate 
goals? Or will countries “build back better”, investing in 
clean energy and development pathways that enable 
them to reduce their dependence on coal, oil, and gas 
production and to meet their climate commitments?  
This year’s special edition of the Production Gap Report 
focuses on the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic 
for the production gap. It considers how government 
responses are widening or narrowing the production gap, 
and provides policymakers with policy options to chart a 
just and equitable transition away from fossil fuels.
The imperative of winding down fossil fuel 
production 
Historically, fossil fuels have formed a major source of 
energy for billions of people. Today, many governments 
continue to rely heavily on revenues generated by coal, oil, 
and gas. Fossil fuels still supply 80% of global energy, with 
governments continuing a long history of subsidizing and 
otherwise supporting the fossil fuel industry (IEA 2020c; 
OECD 2020a). Diversifying revenue streams remains a 
challenge for many fossil-fuel-dependent regions and 
governments (Chapter 4).
There are signs that such dynamics are changing. The 
share of global electricity generated by solar and wind 
power has doubled in the last five years (Jones et al. 2020). 
1. Introduction
For at least a century, world leaders have equated fossil fuels with power. Large stores of coal, oil, 
and gas have been seen as going hand-in-hand with geopolitical advantages and with more oppor-
tunities for development. 
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In 2020, global clean energy investment has continued 
to grow — and was up 5% in the first half of the year — 
while overall energy sector investment is expected to 
drop by 20% (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2020; IEA 
2020d; IEA 2020h). Countries now have compelling en-
vironmental, political, and fiscal reasons to diversify their 
energy sources, as well as their revenue sources. And civil 
society pressure for climate action is growing ever stron-
ger, with many countries and businesses committed to 
bolder and more ambitious actions and targets, including 
dozens of countries that are aiming for net-zero emis-
sions by mid-century or sooner (Darby 2019; Hook 2019; 
Science Based Targets 2020; SDG Knowledge Hub 2019). 
This now includes some of the world’s largest emitters, in-
cluding China (carbon neutral by 2060) and the European 
Union (climate neutral by 2050) (European Commission 
2018; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). 
The risks of relying heavily on fossil fuel development for 
economic activity are numerous, including the volatility 
of fossil fuel markets, increasing competition from other 
energy sources, and widespread policy commitments to 
transition to low-carbon energy systems (Peszko et al. 
2018; Peszko et al. 2020; UNU-INRA 2019). As govern-
ments look ahead to COVID-19 recovery plans — and turn 
to all industries for jobs and economic stimulus — these 
risks are especially acute. 
Meanwhile, a growing number of COVID-19 recovery as-
sessments have demonstrated that government spending 
on low-carbon energy and infrastructure will be a better 
engine of economic growth than spending on fossil fuels 
and associated infrastructure (Bhattacharya and Rydge 
2020; Hepburn et al. 2020; IEA 2020k). In 85% of the 
world, renewable energy is now the cheapest source of 
new bulk electricity, and that percentage is only rising 
(Binnie 2020; Bond et al. 2020; Henze 2020). In contrast 
to a 5% drop in global energy demand, renewable electric-
ity generation is expected to grow by almost 7% in 2020 
(IEA 2020n).
Fossil fuels also come with other environmental, social, and 
political challenges. Extraction and processing can create 
“energy sacrifice zones” that endanger local communities 
and industry workers through air and water pollution, and 
hazardous and radioactive waste, while combustion is a 
major source of the air pollution that contributes to prema-
ture death and multiple diseases worldwide (Healy et al. 
2019; Lelieveld et al. 2019; O’Rourke and Connolly 2003). 
Indeed, a rapid transition away from fossil fuels at the pace 
needed for a 1.5°C pathway has multiple synergies with 
Sustainable Development Goals (Roy et al. 2018).
Fossil fuel interests — which represent a large and con-
centrated political and economic force — often actively 
counter or resist bold climate action. When governments 
are dependent on fossil fuels, this “carbon entanglement” 
can stand in the way of climate policy progress (Gurría 
2013; Newell and Johnstone 2018).
Against this evolving backdrop, the choice to heavily 
invest in fossil fuel production is a political decision as 
much as an economic one. Whether or not governments 
continue down this trajectory will be crucial in determin-
ing the future of the production gap and the world’s ability 
to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. 
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Seizing the opportunity to “build back better”
In the midst of the global health and economic emergency 
brought on by COVID-19, government policymakers must 
address short-term, urgent national interests, while also 
taking a long-term view. It is thus perhaps no surprise that 
in crafting their economic recovery, many governments 
are turning to fossil fuels, a historically important source 
of revenue and energy.
But we cannot lose sight of the climate crisis — or the fact 
that fossil fuels are no longer the economic powerhouse 
they once were. This truth is acknowledged by even some 
major oil and gas companies: in August, BP announced it 
would shift a third of its investment to low-carbon energy 
and reduce oil output by 40% by 2030 (BP 2020b). In 
parallel, some investment firms have begun to shift assets 
away from fossil fuel holdings (BlackRock 2020; Ward 
2019), but arguably far too slowly (Harrabin 2020). 
However, without bold and ambitious government lead-
ership and action, a low-carbon future will remain out of 
reach. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the cen-
tral role of governments in mitigating crises, as well as the 
potential for significant and rapid societal change in the 
face of collective threats. While many countries have taken 
assertive and swift action to prevent the worst of the pan-
demic, strong leadership is needed to transition the world 
towards a greener, safer, and more resilient future. 
This report aims to equip policymakers with options to 
assess and guide the transition away from fossil fuels. It 
starts with an analysis of the size of the production gap, 
and the finding that governments are not yet planning to 
drive down coal, oil, and gas production to the levels need-
ed to meet climate goals (Chapter 2). It then shows the 
extent to which governments have been aiding or moving 
beyond fossil fuel extraction, with a focus on their respons-
es to the COVID-19 crisis (Chapter 3), and details how gov-
ernments can foster a just and equitable transition away 
from fossil fuels (Chapter 4). The report closes with policy 
options for managing fossil fuel production in keeping with 
the imperative to “build back better” (Chapter 5).
Box 1.1. How limiting fossil fuel supply can help achieve climate goals  
To date, climate policy has focused almost exclu-
sively on reducing the demand for fossil fuels, with 
measures to increase energy efficiency, promote 
renewable energy, price carbon, and incentivize be-
havioural shifts. While these and other demand-side 
policies are crucial for a low-carbon transition, the 
near-exclusive focus on demand has enabled a deep 
disconnect between countries’ climate goals and 
their plans for energy production. Many countries ex-
press the intent to both meet Paris Agreement goals 
and increase coal, oil, and gas production to levels 
that are incompatible with those goals.
Policymakers now have a clear opportunity to 
resolve this contradiction as they enact policies 
and direct unprecedented levels of investment into 
economic recovery. Meeting climate goals requires a 
wind-down of fossil fuel production, and the adop-
tion of recovery policies in line with that necessary 
wind-down can set countries on a more stable 
economic path.  
Several countries have already paved the way, by 
adopting “supply-side” policies to limit coal, oil, or 
gas development, support transitions for affect-
ed workers and communities, remove production 
subsidies, and shift investment to low-carbon energy 
(Erickson et al. 2018; Gaulin and Le Billon 2020; SEI 
et al. 2019; Tudela 2020; Appendix B).
These supply-side policies can complement de-
mand-side ones and help to reduce the overall cost 
of meeting climate goals (Asheim et al. 2019; Green 
and Denniss 2018). They also come with numerous 
other benefits, from reducing pollution and health 
impacts and conserving biodiversity, to preventing 
new fossil fuel infrastructure that could later be 
stranded as the result of financial or climate impera-
tives (Epstein 2017; Harfoot et al. 2018). Furthermore, 
such measures can send powerful signals to markets 




Between 2020 and 2030,  
global fossil fuel production 
would have to decline by  
6% per year to follow a 
1.5°C-consistent pathway,  
and by 2% per year to follow  
a 2°C-consistent pathway. 
A 1.5°C-consistent pathway 
implies that coal production 
would decrease annually by  
11% between 2020 and 2030, 
while oil and gas production 
would decrease by 4% and  
3%, respectively.
Countries aim to produce 120% 
and 50% more fossil fuels by 
2030 than would be consistent 
with limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C or 2°C, respectively. 
This translates to a 2% annual 
average growth in global pro-
duction over the next decade.
While the pandemic will likely 
result in a production decline in 
2020 due to lockdown measures, 
the choices made  
by governments as they develop 
their economic recovery 
packages will determine whether 
the production gap narrows  
or widens in the long-term.
The production gap would be 
even wider than estimated if 
carbon dioxide removal practices 
(such as afforestation and 
reforestation) or carbon capture 
and storage fail to supplement 
emissions reductions at scale.
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Last year, the Production Gap Report provided the first 
global assessment of this discrepancy. It found that the 
levels of fossil fuel production planned and projected by 
governments worldwide would exceed the levels consis-
tent with limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C by 120% and 
50%, respectively, in 2030 (SEI et al. 2019). Governments’ 
projected levels of fossil fuel production also exceed 
those implied by countries’ commitments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement.
After the publication of the 2019 Production Gap Re-
port — but largely prior to the widespread outbreak of 
COVID-19 — several countries published updates to their 
fossil fuel production plans and projections. However, the 
future of the production gap is subject to large uncer-
tainties, as the COVID-19 pandemic and its ramifications 
on fossil fuel supply and demand continue to unfold, and 
with governments continuing to develop and implement 
long-term economic recovery plans. The policies em-
bedded in these recovery plans could either deepen the 
lock-in of fossil fuel production or support the transition 
away from them. This chapter takes stock of how recent 
developments could either widen, maintain, or narrow the 
production gap.
2.1 The Fossil Fuel Production Gap  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide 
were planning to produce fossil fuels at levels far in excess 
of those consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. 
In the 2019 Production Gap Report, we quantified this 
discrepancy by considering four indicative pathways of 
future global fossil fuel production. 
First, we estimated a global pathway implied by govern-
ments’ plans and projections,1 based on a review of the 
national energy strategies and outlooks of eight fos-
sil-fuel-producing countries that account for over 60% 
of global production. Second, we defined low-carbon 
pathways that limited warming to 2°C and to 1.5°C, based 
on the mitigation scenarios compiled by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for their Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC 2018b; Rogelj et 
al. 2018). The “2°C-consistent” pathway was calculated as 
the median of scenarios that have at least a 66% probabil-
ity of limiting warming to below 2°C, while the “1.5°C-con-
sistent” pathway was calculated as the median of scenar-
ios with at least a 50% likelihood of limiting warming to 
below 1.5°C. Both pathways were further constrained to 
have limited reliance on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) de-
ployment,2 given the “multiple feasibility and sustainability 
constraints” associated with these measures, as noted by 
the IPCC (IPCC 2018a, p.19). Finally, we estimated a fourth 
pathway that reflects the level of fossil fuel production 
implied by countries’ first nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) under the UN climate process, using the 
New Policies Scenario of the International Energy Agen-
cy’s 2018 World Energy Outlook (IEA 2018). Further details 
on how all of the four pathways were estimated can be 
found in Appendix A of SEI et al., 2019.
2. The Production Gap
Many national governments publish plans and projections for fossil fuel production that inform 
and justify policies and investment decisions by industry and investors. However, few govern-
ments — if any — have evaluated how such plans are aligned or misaligned with their climate 
mitigation commitments and ambitions, including the Paris Agreement goals to limit global  
warming to well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. 
1 Throughout the report, we collectively refer to the national energy plans, projections, outlooks, and strategy documents reviewed as “plans and projections”, given that there are 
varying levels of certainty and intent associated with each document. 
2 Following the approach of the 2018 Climate Action Tracker report (New Climate Institute et al. 2018), we excluded mitigation pathways in which the average 2040–2060 values 
for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) exceeded 5.0 GtCO2/yr, and in which the average 2040–2060 values for negative emissions achieved by the agriculture, 
forestry, and other land use sector (AFOLU) exceeded 3.6 GtCO2/yr. 
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The global levels of fossil fuel production under each of 
these four pathways are shown in Figure 2.1. The figure 
is adapted from the 2019 Report with an update to show 
actual and estimated 2015–2020 values.3 The produc-
tion gap is denominated here in units of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions — essentially, the carbon contained in 
each fuel — as that provides a single metric to tally up 
the gap across coal, oil, and gas.4 This type of account-
ing for CO2 from fossil fuel extraction has been called 
extraction-based accounting (Davis et al. 2011; Erickson 
and Lazarus 2013) or, in some cases, physical carbon flows 
(Peters et al. 2012).
As estimated in the 2019 Production Gap Report, global 
levels of fossil fuel production under current plans and 
projections would be 50% higher than levels consistent 
with limiting warming to 2°C, and 120% more than those 
consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C, by 2030. This is 
the “production gap”. 
3 Fuel-specific 2015–2018 production data are taken from the IEA’s World Energy Balances (2019 edition) (IEA 2020f). For 2019 and 2020, preliminary supply estimates for oil are 
drawn from IEA’s Oil Market Report (IEA 2020e). For gas, preliminary supply estimates are drawn from the IEA’s Natural Gas Information Overview and from Rystad Energy (IEA 
2020l; Rystad Energy 2020a). For coal, supply is calculated based on the estimated percent change in annual coal demand from the IEA’s Global Energy Review (IEA 2020d). 
These reports and data were last accessed on 1 September 2020.
4 In this analysis, the 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent levels of fossil fuel production are derived from the global "primary energy" of coal, oil, and gas variables in the mitigation scenarios 
compiled by the IPCC. These variables generally include “non-energy” uses of coal, oil, and gas (such as for chemical or plastics feedstocks), though this reporting may vary 
between models. The IPCC database does not report what fraction of coal, oil, or gas primary energy is for non-energy uses in past or future years. In this analysis, we assume 
that the percentage of each fuel that is non-energy remains constant at recent levels for the purpose of tallying extraction-based CO2 emissions from fossil fuel production under 
all four pathways (see Appendix B of SEI et al. (2019) for more details) .
Figure 2.1
Global fossil fuel production under four pathways, 2015–2040. This figure is adapted from the 2019 Production Gap Report, updated  
to show actual and estimated 2015–2020 values (black line). For the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways, the median (purple and green lines) and  
25th to 75th percentile range (shaded areas) are shown. Note that the modelled pathways for production consistent with 1.5°C and 2°C 
have not been harmonized to recent actual data (black line); consequently, the median values for the 1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent pathways 
appear above the estimated actual production in 2020. For comparability with other emissions-based analyses, the production gap is 
presented in terms of the CO2 emissions that will result from the combustion of extracted coal, oil, and gas, in units of gigatonnes of CO2 
(GtCO2 = 109 tCO2).  
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The production gap would be slightly smaller if countries 
were to take steps to align their fossil fuel production  
outlooks with their existing NDCs (shown by the “pro-
duction implied by climate pledges” pathway in Figure 
2.1). However, this pathway is still inconsistent with the 
temperature limits of the Paris Agreement. 
Additional insights can be drawn from comparing the 
annual rates of change of the different pathways shown 
in Figure 2.1. For example, global fossil fuel production 
would have to decline by 6% per year from 2020 to 2030 
in order to follow the median 1.5°C-consistent pathway, 
and by 2% per year to follow the median 2°C-consistent 
pathway.5 By contrast, if global fossil fuel production  
were to return to the 2030 level projected by government 
plans and projections (red line in Figure 2.1), this instead 
would imply a growth of 2% per year between 2020  
and 2030, further committing the world to dangerous 
climate change.
Preliminary estimates suggest that global fossil fuel pro-
duction levels could decrease by 7% in 2020 relative to 
2019.6 This would be the largest annual decrease in global 
fossil fuel production levels since global statistics have 
been recorded (1971) (IEA 2020f). However, the drivers 
of this decline — pandemic-induced lockdown, travel 
restrictions, and economic recession — are devastating 
and untenable. By contrast, a deliberate and systemic 
transition away from fossil fuels — driven by climate 
concerns and new economic opportunities (Bhattacharya 
and Rydge 2020; Hepburn et al. 2020) — would help to 
ensure that a low-carbon transition occurs in a way that is 
sustainable and equitable, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Figure 2.2 shows the global production pathways for 
individual fuels, updated from the 2019 Production Gap 
Report to show actual and estimated 2015–2020 values.
To be consistent with a 1.5°C pathway, global coal, oil, and 
gas production would have to decline annually by 11%, 
5 These annual rates of decline are derived from the median values in 2020 and 2030 under each model pathway; the 2020 model values have not been harmonized with the 
estimated, actual production in 2020. The rates are slightly lower than those estimated from model results for total greenhouse gas emissions from all sources in the 2019 
Emissions Gap Report (8% and 3% per year for keeping warming below 1.5°C and 2°C, respectively) (UNEP 2019). This is partly due to the fact that, from 2020 to 2030, CO2 
emissions from the agriculture, forestry, and other land use sector generally decline more quickly in the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways than CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. In addition, 
by 2030, carbon capture and storage starts to reduce net CO2 emissions without corresponding reductions in fossil fuel production and use in both pathways.
6 See Footnote 3.
Figure 2.2
Global coal, oil, and gas production (exajoule or EJ per year) under four pathways, 2015–2040. This figure is adapted from the 2019 
Report, updated to show actual and estimated 2015–2020 values (black lines). For the 1.5°C and 2°C pathways, the median (purple and 
green lines) and 25th to 75th percentile range (shaded areas) are shown. Note that the modelled pathways for production consistent 
with 1.5°C and 2°C have not been harmonized to recent actual data (black lines); consequently, the median values for the 1.5°C- and 
2°C-consistent pathways appear above the estimated actual production for coal and oil in 2020. Physical units are displayed as secondary 
axes: billion tonnes per year (Gt/yr) for coal, million barrels per day (mb/d) for oil, and trillion cubic meters per year (tcm/yr) for gas.
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4%, and 3%, respectively, from 2020 to 2030. Preliminary 
estimates suggest that global coal, oil, and gas production 
could decrease by 8%, 7%, and 3%, respectively, in 2020 
relative to 2019,7 primarily as a result of the COVID-19 pan-
demic and lockdown measures. A return to governments’ 
planned and projected levels in 2030 — shown by the red 
lines in Figure 2.2 — would imply an annual growth of 2% 
for each fuel.
A global wind-down of fossil fuel production that would 
be consistent with staying below 1.5°C or 2°C could be 
achieved by a different mix of decline rates for coal, oil, 
and gas. The trajectories shown in Figure 2.2 are depen-
dent on the cost assumptions of the underlying models. 
For example, gas declines the slowest because it is about 
half as carbon-intensive as coal, and models have general-
ly found gas to be a cost-competitive resource to displace 
coal in the short term; however, this implies substantial 
reliance on carbon capture and storage (CCS) at gas pow-
er plants from 2040 onwards, and assumes that methane 
emissions associated with producing, transporting, and 
distributing gas can be minimized (Rogelj et al. 2018). 
Moreover, switching from coal to gas could pose risks of 
carbon lock-in if gas power plants are not retired early 
(Fofrich et al. 2020).
It is also important to note that, even though the 1.5°C- 
and 2°C-consistent pathways used here were selected to 
exclude scenarios with very high reliance on certain CDR 
practices,8 the models nonetheless rely on some degree 
of CDR and CCS being achieved (Rogelj et al. 2018). For 
example, each pathway relies on a median of around 1 
gigatonne of CO2 per year (GtCO2/yr) of CCS (captured 
from bioenergy, fossil fuels, or industry) in 2030. This 
amount increases to around 5 GtCO2/yr in 2040. If such 
technologies (or CDR practices, such as afforestation) fail 
to succeed at scale, or if their political appeal deters other 
near-term mitigation solutions (Anderson and Peters 
2016; McLaren 2020), then the reductions in fossil fuels 
would need to be even more rapid, and the production 
gap would be even wider than estimated here. 
2.2 Pre-COVID-19 updates to government plans 
and projections
In last year’s report, the size of the global production gap 
was estimated primarily from the plans and projections of 
eight major fossil-fuel-producing countries representing 
60% of global production. Since the release of the 2019 
report — but largely prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 — 
seven of these countries have published updated produc-
tion plans and projections (see Appendix A for details of 
document sources).
Table 2.1 summarizes the changes for each fuel forecasted 
by these updated documents, where available. Because 
these plans and projections are subject to large uncertain-
ties due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a more comprehen-
sive update of the production gap analysis is planned for 
our 2021 report. 
7 See Footnote 3.
8 See Footnote 2.
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Prior to the pandemic, there were some encouraging signs, 
with Indonesia and the United States (US) having lowered 
their projections for future coal production. However, 
Russia increased its projected future coal production, 
while Australia, Canada, the US, and Russia also forecast 
even larger increases in their oil and gas production. 
The 2019 report estimated the size of the global produc-
tion gap in 2030 to be 21 and 13 GtCO2 in excess of the 
1.5°C- and 2°C-consistent pathways, respectively. The net 
effect of the changes in the plans and projections from 
countries with available updates for 2030 — Canada, 
Indonesia, Russia, and the US — leads to a very slight 
widening of the global production gap in 2030 of around 
0.2 GtCO2.
In addition, several plans and projections from other 
countries not assessed in the 2019 gap analysis point to 
intentions for major growth in oil production, though these 
were also published prior to the outbreak of COVID-19. 
For example, for the 2020–2030 period, Mexico foresaw 
a 50% growth (Secretaría de Energía 2017), Brazil and the 
United Arab Emirates each planned for a 70% increase 
(Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 2018; Ministério de 
Minas e Energia 2019), and Argentina aimed for a 130% 
increase in oil production (Secretario de Gobierno de 
Energía 2018). These four countries currently account for 
around 10% of global oil production (IEA 2020f).
In summary, prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, all signs 
were pointing to a continuation of the global fossil fuel 
production gap.
2.3 Implications of government responses to 
the COVID-19 pandemic  
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to worldwide disruptions 
in energy markets and industries (Box 2.1), with severe 
effects on the workers and communities that rely on them 
for livelihoods and revenues. Governments across the 
world have already deployed emergency rescue packages 
and are in the process of developing longer-term econom-
ic recovery plans. 
The choices made by governments in fossil-fuel-producing 
regions could have profound and long-lasting implications. 
If recovery efforts are predicated on a rebound to pre-
COVID-19 plans and projections for expansion in coal, oil, 



















to prior  
projection
India – – – – – –
Australia 2024a 548 +8 0.5 0 164 +19
China 2050 – – – – 350 0
Norway 2023 n/a n/a 2.3 0 119 -1
Canada 2030 n/a n/a 6.4 +0.2 187 +7
















2030 484 -103 21 +0.4 1,106 +28
Net change in 2030 -52 to -45 +0.6 to +0.7 +94 to +118
a  The numbers shown here are drawn from the March 2020 edition of the Resources and Energy Quarterly from the Office of the Chief Economist. A more recent version was 
published in June 2020, but with forecasts out to 2022 only. The 2022 coal, oil, and gas production projections in the June version show a 1–3% decline compared to the  
March version. 
b  Updated projections only available for 2024 and 2035. The updated 2030 values are estimated by linear interpolation between these years.
Table 2.1
Future fossil fuel production in publicly available government plans and projections (as of September 2020) for the eight countries whose 
outlooks were assessed in the 2019 production gap analysis, and their respective changes. Note that the latest year of projections available 
differs among the countries. See Appendix A for source details. (A dash (–) denotes that no updates were available; n/a means not 
applicable or denotes production of less than 1 Exajoule/year.)
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then they risk maintaining the large production gap. Indeed, 
as Chapter 3 explains, subsidies for fossil fuel production 
were already on the rise prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
and government recovery measures have thus far provided 
far more support to fossil fuels than to clean energy. 
However, directing economic stimulus to boost fossil fuel 
production and entrench reliance on fossil fuels is a risky 
bet, and not just for the climate. The recent, steep drop in 
fossil fuel demand and oil prices has exposed the fragility 
and lack of resilience of economies dependent on fossil 
fuel revenues, as described in Chapter 4. Without a con-
certed plan to manage a transition away from fossil fuels, 
recent events could provide a glimpse of future impacts to 
some fossil-fuel-dependent economies. 
Instead of further entangling their economies with fossil 
fuels, governments could “build back better” and begin 
to close the production gap through “green” recovery 
measures. As of September 2020, we are aware of only 
one global assessment of the possible effects of green 
recovery measures on fossil fuel consumption and 
production: the IEA’s 2021–2023 “Sustainable Recovery 
Plan” (IEA 2020k). Figure 2.3 shows a range of near-term 
energy-sector CO2 emissions outcomes associated with 
this plan (dotted green lines): emissions are estimated to 
decline by 1.7–4.0 GtCO2 from 2019 to 2023 (IEA 2020j).9  
The optimistic outlook for this plan could put global CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels onto a pathway that is consis-
tent with limiting global warming to 2°C. 
However, recovery plans are by their nature short-term, 
and longer-term strategies will be needed to ensure that 
a sustainable recovery is maintained and accelerated. 
As described in Chapter 5, NDCs and long-term low 
greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LEDS) 
provide important avenues for countries to articulate 
Figure 2.3
The fossil fuel production gap will continue to widen if countries continue to support fossil fuels and return to their pre-COVID plans and 
projections for expanded production (blue arrow). Alternatively, strong green recovery efforts could put future fossil fuel production on a 
pathway much closer to Paris Agreement limits. The trajectories of the illustrative green arrows are based on the estimated range of 
energy-sector CO2 emission reductions following the IEA’s 2021-2023 “Sustainable Recovery Plan” (see text for details).
9 The IEA estimates that under its Sustainable Recovery Plan, global greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector could decline from 2019 to 2023 by 2.3 to 4.9 GtCO2e  
(IEA 2020j). We estimated the CO2-specific reductions based on our correspondence with the lead author of IEA’s Sustainable Recovery report (IEA 2020k).
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Box 2.1 Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on coal, oil, and gas markets    
The first half of 2020 saw the global onset of 
COVID-19 and, with it, stark reductions in economic 
activity and fossil fuel use. Expectations for annual 
coal, oil, and gas consumption across all of 2020 are 
down 8%, 8%, and 4%, respectively, compared to 
2019 (IEA 2020e; IEA 2020d; Rystad Energy 2020a). 
It remains too soon to tell how energy systems will 
emerge from the pandemic, as economic recovery 
efforts are still being designed and implemented. 
Energy industry forecasters have dropped their 
near-term outlooks for fossil fuels, though several 
have largely retained the view that demand for, and 
supply of, oil and gas will rebound in the long term 
to pre-COVID-19 projections. Initial industry fore-
casts estimate an increase in oil demand of 1%–10% 
by 2030 above 2019 levels, and an increase in gas 
demand of 9%–22% over the same period (Crooks 
et al. 2020; Rystad Energy 2020b), suggesting little, 
if any, departure from the long-term trends shown in 
Figure 2.2. Conversely, some analysts and industry 
executives have posited that, given the pandemic-in-
duced disruption in demand and underlying long-
term changes in consumption patterns, demand for 
oil may never return to 2019 levels; in other words, it 
may have peaked (Bond 2020; Grubb 2020; Kusnetz 
2020; Lee 2020; Lewis 2020).
For coal, the outlook for future demand appears to 
be flat or declining slightly (Crooks et al. 2020). This 
is partly driven by the long-term trend of renewables 
increasing in cost-competitiveness: solar photovolta-
ics and onshore wind are now the cheapest sources 
of new-build electricity for at least two-thirds of the 
global population (Henze 2020). However, this out-
look is subject to large uncertainties, given that coal 
relies almost exclusively on the electricity market, 
which will be highly sensitive to post-COVID-19 eco-
nomic recovery (Bodnar et al. 2020; Henze 2020; IEA 
2020d; S&P Global Platts 2019).
All in all, the costs of renewable electricity — and 
the costs of technologies that use electricity instead 
of fossil fuels — have been declining so rapidly that 
the additional hit to fossil fuel markets caused by the 
pandemic may represent a permanent setback to 
the continued dominance of fossil fuels. While these 
economic trends point to a low-carbon future, the 
question now is whether policymakers will seize this 
moment to ensure a long-term transition that takes 
place at the scale and speed necessary to meet the 
Paris Agreement’s goals.
commitments to align their domestic energy strategies 
with their climate ambitions. Furthermore, countries 
should strive to do this in a way that is just and equitable 
for all countries (Chapter 4). 
2.4 Conclusions  
Many governments in countries endowed with large 
stores of coal, oil, and gas have adhered to the belief 
that the exploitation of these resources is essential for 
economic development and energy security (Strambo 
and González Espinosa 2020). Many, in turn, have issued 
optimistic outlooks for fossil fuel production, complement-
ed by fiscal, regulatory, and other forms of government 
support.  As a result, the world’s plans for fossil fuel  
production are incompatible with limiting warming to 
1.5°C or 2°C.  
Meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals will require a 
different approach, and it will not be easy. The ties 
between governments and fossil fuel interests are often 
strong, and public officials have, in many cases during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, sought to aid fossil fuel produc-
tion and consumption without any climate mitigation or 
additional pollution reduction requirements (see Chapter 
3). Nonetheless, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, leading 
countries have demonstrated that the policy tools — and 
government know-how — for bringing about a just and 
equitable transition from fossil fuels do exist.
As governments seek to develop long-term economic 
recovery plans in response to the current public health 
emergency, they can seize the opportunity — and respon-
sibility — to avoid locking in the climate crisis and instead 
strive towards a managed, just, and equitable transition 
from fossil fuels. 
3
Government support 
and COVID-19  
responses:  
implications for  
fossil fuel production  
Governments’ responses to the 
COVID-19 crisis have tended to 
intensify patterns that existed 
prior to the pandemic: 
jurisdictions that already heavily 
subsidized the production of 
fossil fuels have added support 
to coal, oil, and gas, while those 
with stronger commitments to a 
transition to clean energy are 
now using stimulus and recovery 
packages to accelerate this shift.
Governments still have the 
opportunity to “build back 
better” by enacting measures  
to move beyond fossil-fuelled 
development pathways and to 
make any support related to 
fossil fuel production conditional 
on improved environmental 
performance.
Governments are responding  
to the COVID-19 crisis with  
major — and often new —  
forms of fiscal, economic, and 
environmental policy commit-
ments that could have long-
lasting consequences for the 
prospects of a low-carbon 
transition.  
G20 governments have directed 
more COVID-19 recovery support 
to fossil fuel production and 
consumption than to renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and 
other low-carbon alternatives 
(USD 233 billion vs. USD 146 
billion, as of November 2020). 
Key Messages
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Many governments, especially those with abundant fossil 
fuel reserves, provide support to fossil fuel production 
with the stated intention of increasing domestic energy 
supplies, reducing imports, and generating exports and 
rents (Bast et al. 2015). They also remain tied to support 
for coal, oil, and gas production by powerful, incumbent 
interests and by narratives about dependence of 
economic development on fossil fuels (Bang and Lahn 
2019; Curran 2020; Graham et al. 2019; Stokes 2020; 
Strambo and González Espinosa 2020). This support, 
such as tax breaks and direct government spending, can 
encourage investment in fossil fuel production that would 
otherwise not be economically viable, leading to greater 
production, consumption, and global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (Erickson et al. 2020; Gerasimchuk et al. 
2017; Ross et al. 2017).
Now, the COVID-19 crisis has precipitated more govern-
ment commitments to support specific energy production 
and consumption activities. Against this backdrop, leaders 
of multilateral institutions — the United Nations, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
International Energy Agency (IEA), World Bank Group, and 
others — have called for countries to “build back better,” 
by putting clean energy jobs and a just transition at the 
centre of stimulus packages and by avoiding the potential 
lock-in associated with boosting high-carbon industries 
(IEA 2020m; United Nations Secretary-General 2020).  
However, between the start of the COVID-19 crisis and  
the time of writing in November 2020, governments have  
directed more support, on a global scale, to fossil fuel  
production and consumption than to low-carbon alter-
natives. While there are some national examples of good 
practice, a change of course is needed if the world is to 
recover better from the current crisis.
3.1 Government support mechanisms for  
fossil fuel production
Plans, targets, and projections
National plans and projections play key roles in driving 
government policy and private investment. With state-
owned enterprises controlling approximately 55% of 
current oil and gas production, up to 90% of oil and gas 
reserves, and well over half of coal production, govern-
ment plans are central to the future development of fossil 
fuel resources (Beaton and Roberts 2019; Nelson et al. 
2014; NRGI 2020). Even in countries that do not explicitly 
plan or control fossil fuel production, official projections of 
coal, oil, and gas output send powerful signals to inves-
tors and serve to inform business decisions on new and 
existing infrastructure. 
Government plans and projections — as updated after 
the 2019 Production Gap Report, but largely before the 
COVID-19 pandemic — suggest continued efforts among 
3. Government support and COVID-19 responses:  
implications for fossil fuel production 
Last year’s Production Gap Report showed how government actions — including plans, targets, 
direct investment, public finance, and other support measures — serve to widen the production 
gap. Here, we consider how these and other actions have evolved in the past year, with a specific 
focus on new support measures introduced in response to the COVID-19 crisis, and their potential 
implications for the production gap.
A US Coast Guard officer documents oil tankers anchored near the  
ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles amid the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Photo: Mario Tama / Getty Images.
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major producers to expand the extraction of fossil fuels, 
especially oil and gas (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1). The re-
cent, steep drop in oil prices amid the COVID-19 pandemic 
has also led governments to consider and take additional 
steps to support domestic production in the near-term, 
through threats of tariffs on imported oil and through 
large-scale purchases for strategic reserves in order to 
reduce market surpluses (IEA 2020g; Sheppard 2020). 
These efforts illustrate the active roles that governments 
often take, individually and in coordination, to manage and 
support fossil fuel production in general, and oil produc-
tion in particular, as discussed in Box 3.1. Indeed, coor-
dinated government responses could eventually help to 
manage reductions in fossil fuel production that are in line 
with climate goals. 
Subsidies 
Fossil fuel subsidies are a form of public support.10 Through 
them, governments or public bodies accord financial bene-
fits to the consumption and production of fossil fuels. 
Subsidies to fossil fuel production directly benefit the 
extraction of coal, oil, and gas.11 However, coal, oil, and gas 
producers also benefit from subsidies to fossil fuel con-
sumption, which encourage demand for these commodi-
ties. In this respect, production subsidies lead to “wasteful 
consumption,” and consumption subsidies lead to the 
excessive extraction of coal, oil, and gas; the latter also 
largely benefits wealthier consumers of fossil fuels, rather 
those in need of increased energy access (Gerasimchuk 
et al. 2017; Zinecker, Sanchez, et al. 2018).12 
Consumption subsidies constitute the largest portion  
of total fossil fuel subsidies. Across 42 emerging and  
developing economies tracked by the IEA, these subsidies 
amounted to USD 438 billion in 2018 and USD 318 billion 
in 2019 (IEA 2020b). This decline was due to two factors: 
the fact that the magnitude of subsidies fluctuates with 
global oil prices, and continued progress in some countries 
to reform and reduce subsidies (Gerasimchuk et al. 2018).12
With both oil prices and demand markedly lower in 
2020, the IEA has projected consumption subsidies will 
drop by yet another 43% from 2019 levels to USD 180 
billion in 2020 (IEA 2020b). Amid lower oil prices, several 
countries, including Ecuador, Nigeria, and Tunisia, have 
announced the deregulation of some of their domestic 
energy prices (España 2020; IEA 2020i; James-Igbinado-
lor 2020). However, there is a historical tendency for such 
reforms to backslide when oil prices go back up, leading 
to the reintroduction of subsidies (Beaton and Adeoti 
2020; Mahdavi et al. 2020).
The recent decline in consumption subsidies has trans-
lated into an overall drop in total subsidies to fossil fuels; 
they fell from USD 582 billion in 2018 to USD 472 billion 
in 2019 across a set of 77 countries (IEA 2020b; OECD 
2020b).13 But this masks a concerning trend: fossil fuel 
production subsidies are actually on the rise. According 
to the OECD, direct budget transfers and tax expenditure 
support for the production of fossil fuels increased by 
38% in 2019 — to USD 54 billion, from USD 39 billion in 
2018 — in a subset of 44 advanced and emerging econo-
mies (OECD 2020b).14  
Leading providers of fossil fuel producer subsidies, by 
quantified monetary value, include Canada, China, Russia, 
and the United States (US) (OECD 2020b).  
The actual amount of producer subsidies may be con-
siderably higher. The OECD estimate does not include 
many unquantified producer subsidies identified in other 
studies (Bast et al. 2015). For example, many governments 
10 Most of the commonly used forms of government support to fossil fuel production fall under the World Trade Organization’s definition of a subsidy (Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) Article 1.1). By targeting fossil fuel producers, such measures typically confer benefits to a specific industry or group of industries (ASCM 
Article 2) (Marrakesh Agreement 1994).
11 Producer subsidies span all stages of the fossil fuel production process, from research, development, and exploration, to operations, transport, processing, marketing, 
decommissioning, and site remediation (Aldy 2013; Koplow 2018; OECD 2013). 
12 Most consumption subsidies cover the gap between domestically regulated prices and the international price benchmark: the smaller the gap, the lower the subsidy. Therefore, 
as oil prices declined from USD 71 per barrel in 2018 to USD 64 in 2019 (Brent annual average), the value of oil consumption subsidies shrank accordingly (EIA 2020).
13 This broader figure integrates results from the IEA subsidy database, which only covers consumer subsidies in mostly non-OECD countries (IEA 2020b), with findings from the 
OECD inventory on both consumer and producer subsidies in the OECD member states and seven large emerging economies (OECD 2020b).
14 In 2019, increased support to producers included direct budgetary transfers to alleviate corporate debt, direct investments in fossil fuel infrastructure, and tax provisions that 
confer preferential treatment on capital expenditures by the industry (OECD 2020b).
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Box 3.1 Coordinated government efforts to manage oil production  
For decades, the Organization of the Petroleum  
Exporting Countries (OPEC) has attempted to regu-
late world oil markets through oil production quotas. 
This group of oil-producing countries (currently 13), 
led by Saudi Arabia, has joined forces with several 
other producers, most notably Russia, to form the  
so-called OPEC+ forum (24 countries). This forum 
seeks oil price stabilization, but with mixed results, 
owing in part to growing shale oil and gas production 
in the US (Van de Graaf and Bradshaw 2018). 
Just as discussions to extend oil production cuts fell 
through in March 2020 (Yergin 2020), the COVID-19 
shock precipitated a steep drop in oil demand, 
mostly because of a sudden fall in road and air travel 
as countries went into lockdown. Prices plummeted 
from well above USD 60 a barrel in January 2020, 
to near USD 20 by the end of March, and briefly be-
came negative in the US, for the first time in history, 
due to shortages in storage infrastructure (Brower  
et al. 2020). 
By mid-April, OPEC+ countries were back at the 
negotiating table and agreed to the biggest supply 
cut ever recorded: nearly 10 million barrels per day 
(mb/d) for two months, equivalent to roughly 10% 
of global production, and then 7.7 mb/d for the six 
subsequent months, and 5.8 mb/d for the following 
16 months (OPEC 2020). The cuts received broad 
backing from the G20 and the IEA (Sheppard et al. 
2020) and were joined by Norway (Norwegian Minis-
try of Petroleum and Energy 2020). Major consumers 
of oil, such as Australia, China, India, Republic of 
Korea, and the US, pledged to fill their strategic oil 
storage sites to the brim to accommodate excess oil, 
offering yet another form of support to producers 
(IEA 2020g).
As the oil sector slashes production and invest-
ment — the IEA has projected a 32% drop in oil and 
gas investment from 2019 to 2020 (IEA 2020h) — 
and the world emerges from lockdowns, oil prices 
may continue to climb back closer to prior levels. 
However, peak oil demand, which many commen-
tators had suggested was coming even before the 
COVID-19 shock, may have arrived already, due to 
broader market trends with potentially long-lasting 
demand reductions flowing from the COVID-19  
pandemic (Carrington et al. 2020; Rapier 2020; 
Vettese 2020). 
The IEA estimates that oil demand will fall by a  
record 8.1 mb/d this year (IEA 2020e). While this 
decline will lead to a near-term drop in emissions, 
it will also likely lead to serious disruption for 
governments, workers, regions, and societies 
currently dependent on fossil fuels. Ideally, future 
declines, as needed to meet the temperature limits of 
the Paris Agreement (see Chapter 2), will be planned, 
managed, and just, with the economic burden 
shouldered equitably (Muttitt and Kartha 2020). 
Some observers suggest that coalitions of oil produc-
ers, such as OPEC or OPEC+, could serve as agents 
to manage a decline in oil production (Dobson 2020; 
Muttitt 2020). While the recent OPEC+ arrangement 
was informed by some equity considerations — no 
cuts were asked from countries facing significant  
domestic challenges like Iran, Libya, and Venezuela — 
it does not formally include some major wealthy oil 
producers (e.g. the US, Canada, Norway), and has 
left several oil-producing developing countries, such 
as Iraq and Nigeria, with severe budgetary shortfalls 
(Trout 2020). To support oil-production-dependent 
developing countries in diversifying their economies 
and to enable a just and equitable transition, new ar-
rangements will therefore be needed. These could in-
clude, for example, conditional financial and technol-
ogy transfers, conditional debt relief, or the sharing 
of carbon tax revenues between fuel importers and 
exporters (Peszko et al. 2019; Peszko et al. 2020). 
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also grant labour, health, environmental, and other regula-
tory exemptions that artificially lower costs of production 
for coal, oil, and gas production (Burton, Lott, et al. 2018; 
Koplow 2018; Strambo et al. 2018). 
All these forms of production subsidies can bring other-
wise unprofitable oil and gas resources to the market, 
in turn stimulating greater production, demand (through 
lower prices), and associated GHG emissions (Erickson 
et al. 2017; Gerasimchuk et al. 2017; Peszko et al. 2020). 
Furthermore, government subsidies also send normative 
signals to markets and societies that extraction activities 
should be supported, and they can reinforce the political 
influence of the industry (Erickson et al. 2020; Newell and 
Johnstone 2018; Sovacool 2017). Producers often call for, 
and governments often respond with, financial support in 
times of fossil fuel price decline and lower returns on coal, 
oil, and gas production (Victor 2009).
The recent increase in subsidies for fossil fuel production 
stands in contrast to the pledge G20 governments made 
in 2009, and have reiterated since, to “phase out and ra-
tionalize, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel sub-
sidies” (G20 2009). This commitment has been echoed in 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 12.c and the 
supporting indicator 12.c.1 (UN General Assembly 2015; 
UNEP et al. 2019). 
Public finance 
Governments also support fossil fuel production through 
development finance, export credit agencies, and other 
public finance institutions they invest in and govern. Public 
finance institutions have a wide range of instruments to 
reduce the costs and risks of private investment, including 
grants, loans, equity, insurance, and guarantees, often at a 
subsidized, below-market value. Their use of these instru-
ments, signalling of government priorities, political leverage, 
and research and advisory capacity can increase private 
investment in fossil fuel production and other high-carbon 
sectors (OECD 2017; Tucker and DeAngelis 2020).
Governments committed under the Paris Agreement to 
make finance flows “consistent with a pathway towards 
low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development” 
(Article 2.1(c)). However, since the Agreement’s adop-
tion, public finance has continued to support fossil fuels 
far more than clean energy. From 2016 to 2018, public 
finance for fossil fuels from export credit agencies, de-
velopment finance institutions, and the major multilateral 
development banks averaged USD 77 billion a year in G20 
countries, more than three times the level of support the 
same institutions provided for clean energy (Tucker and 
DeAngelis 2020). Over two-thirds of this public finance  
for fossil fuels came from China, Japan, Canada, and the 
Republic of Korea alone, and it included USD 12 billion a 
year for exploration and extraction of new reserves  
(Tucker and DeAngelis 2020).  
Central banks are poised to play a major role in the 
COVID-19 recovery. These banks could either encourage a 
low-carbon pathway or further reinforce carbon entangle-
ment, through their direct involvement in financial markets 
through quantitative easing (bond purchase), as well as 
supervisory mechanisms, including collateral requirements 
and climate risk disclosure regulations (NGFS 2019). How-
ever, research suggests that central banks’ bond purchase 
programmes prior to COVID-19 benefited incumbent fossil 
fuel companies (Bolton and Kacperczyk 2020; Campiglio 
et al. 2018; Matikainen et al. 2017; Steele 2020). 
By contrast, a growing group of public finance institutions 
are actively reducing their support to fossil fuels. The 
European Investment Bank, the World Bank Group, Ireland 
Strategic Investment Fund, Swedfund, Agence Française 
de Développement, and CDC Group, among others, have 
implemented policies to limit all or most of their finance 
for coal, oil, and gas (Agence Française de Développement 
2019; CDC Group 2020; Chestney 2020; European 
Investment Bank 2019; Swedfund 2017; World Bank 2017; 
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see also Appendix B). Environment ministries from 26 
countries and over 100 other partners are also working to 
“green” China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the world’s largest 
infrastructure investment initiative (Treyer and Rankovic 
2019; UNEP 2018). Efforts like these — which work to 
avoid the lock-in of resource extraction and carbon-
intensive infrastructure — are critical as major public 
investments are considered in response to the COVID 
pandemic.
State-owned enterprises  
As noted above, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) control 
the majority of global fossil fuel production. Governments 
often use SOEs as a means to strategically control sensi-
tive energy supplies, and energy SOEs can be an import-
ant source of public revenue (Mahdavi 2020). Moreover, 
SOE investments can influence the level and type of 
investment by private firms (Prag et al. 2018). Many SOEs 
serve as major employers and fulfil other government-im-
posed social obligations (IEA 2020d; Victor et al. 2011). 
While historically SOEs have largely managed investment 
and extraction to maximize production and revenue, they 
could also serve as effective mechanisms for winding 
down fossil fuel production (Araújo 2014; Aronoff 2020; 
Mayer et al. 2017). For instance, the ability of OPEC+ to 
coordinate on production targets (Box 3.1) is predicated 
on its high concentration of SOEs in control of oil produc-
tion. To date, there is a limited, but slowly growing, list of 
examples of SOEs serving as vehicles of a transition away 
from fossil fuels. For instance, the Swedish SOE Vatten-
fall and the Danish SOE Ørsted (formerly DONG) have 
successfully diversified their investments from fossil fuels 
into renewables (IISD 2019). In 2018, Coal India Limited 
announced plans to start diversifying from coal mining 
and set up 20 gigawatts (GW) of solar projects over the 
next 10 years (IISD 2019). 
3.2 COVID-19 response and stimulus measures 
Wealthier countries are injecting trillions of dollars into 
their economies in an effort to mitigate an economic re-
cession, create employment opportunities, and stimulate 
recovery from the COVID-19 crisis (Wilkes and Carvalho 
2020), while poorer and heavily indebted countries are 
struggling to find resources to combat these and other 
challenges. Countries are also citing COVID-19 as the  
rationale for changing laws, and in some cases rolling 
back environmental and labour protections (Harris 2020; 
US EPA 2020). As many analysts have noted, the impact of 
these measures on future energy systems and emissions 
could be profound and long-lasting, either locking in fossil 
fuels or facilitating a transition away from coal, oil, and gas 
dependence (Hanna et al. 2020; Hepburn et al. 2020).
Despite widespread calls for a green recovery, as of No-
vember 2020, governments have directed more support 
to fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive activities than to 
clean energy and low-carbon sectors. One recent assess-
ment suggests that most countries’ stimulus packages 
have been “environmentally harmful” overall, with only a 
handful (e.g. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) 
characterized as neutral or positive (Vivid Economics 
2020). Another assessment finds that, as of early Novem-
ber 2020, government stimulus and recovery packages 
had committed nearly five times more to high-carbon sec-
tors, such as fossil fuel extraction, aviation, and car manu-
facturing (USD 878 billion), than to low-carbon industries, 
such as electric vehicles, energy efficiency, and renewable 
energy (USD 179 billion) (Cuming 2020).15 
As of November 2020, G20 governments16 had commit-
ted USD 233 billion to activities that support fossil fuel 
production and consumption (e.g. for airlines, airports, 
highways, car manufacturers, fuel, and fossil-based 
power consumers), as compared with USD 146 billion 
to renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-carbon 
alternatives such as electric vehicles, rail and public 
transport, and cycling and pedestrian systems, according 
to the Energy Policy Tracker, which focuses specifically on 
support for clean and fossil energy (Energy Policy Tracker 
2020).17 Figure 3.1 illustrates the varying levels of support 
by country.  
Total COVID-19 response support specific to fossil fuel 
production stood at USD 23 billion as of November 2020. 
Some of this support has been directed specifically 
towards environmental benefit. For example, the Cana-
dian federal government has committed USD 1.8 billion 
towards the clean-up of orphaned and abandoned oil and 
gas wells and the creation of a fund focused on methane 
emission reduction (Prime Minister of Canada 2020). The 
province of Alberta will also use some of these funds for 
technology and innovation opportunities in the natural gas 
15 These estimates do not include the European Council’s intention to direct 30% of the Recovery Fund (EUR 750 billion) and Multi-Annual Financial Framework (EUR 1.074 trillion) 
funding to achieving climate targets (European Council 2020). This proposal still requires approval by the European Parliament and specification in terms of areas of spending, 
which may also include natural gas projects. 
16 In 2019, the 19 countries of the G20 (the 20th member being the European Union) accounted for 60% of global oil and gas production and 92% of global coal production 
(calculations based on the volumetric data of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 2020a)). 
17 The database aggregates government commitments based on the officially reported face value of different mechanisms, including grants, tax expenditure, loans, loan 
guarantees, and many other hybrid tools. 
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industry (Government of Alberta 2020). As countries re-
spond to the COVID-19 pandemic, efforts to tackle legacy 
pollution can generate valuable jobs and environmental 
benefits in the near-term. Nevertheless, such support also 
poses the risk of shifting liabilities from industry to gov-
ernment, in seeming contradiction to the “polluter pays” 
principle. 
The vast majority of commitments of support to fossil fuel 
producers have lacked any social, economic, or environ-
mental conditions, which represents a lost opportunity to 
combine COVID-19 response measures and green recov-
ery (Corkal et al. 2020). Examples of unconditional support 
to fossil fuel production include: 
j  Argentina cut its tax on fossil fuels exports (Official 
Bulletin of the Argentina Republic 2020).
j  The Australian state of Queensland froze fees and charges 
for coal and gas exploration (Burt and Maykin 2020). 
j  The Canadian province of Alberta provided USD 5.5 bil-
lion in equity and loan guarantees for the Keystone XL 
pipeline (Energy Policy Tracker 2020; The Government 
of Alberta 2020). 
j  The Canadian province of British Columbia froze fees 
for oil and gas pipelines and levies for orphaned well lia-
bility (British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission 2020). 
j  Estonia allocated USD 136 million in aid to the state-
owned company Eesti Energia for the construction of a 
GHG-intensive oil shale plant (Banks 2020; Tammiste et 
al. 2020). 
j  India provided a rebate on revenue payable to the gov-
ernment on coal extraction (Press Information Bureau 
of the Government of India 2020). 
j  Mexico announced a plan to reduce the tax on oil ex-
traction in response to the international oil price crash, 
providing USD 3 billion in fiscal stimulus to Pemex, the 
national oil company (Government of Mexico 2020). 
j  Norway approved a temporary tax relief package for its 
oil and gas industry worth USD 10.8 billion (Adomaitis 
and Solsvik 2020; KPMG 2020).
j  Russia amended its Tax Code to provide relief on the oil 
and gas extraction tax in its Arctic zone (Reuters 2020).
j  The Bank of England provided around USD 1.3 billion  
in debt support to two oil service companies,  
Schlumberger and Baker Hughes (Bank of England 2020).
j  The US government rolled back several environmen-
tal regulations, and the Department of Interior has 
offered waivers or reductions in royalty rates and rental 
payments for oil and gas extraction on federal lands 
and waters (Energy Policy Tracker 2020; Englund and 
Grandoni 2020).
One stated rationale for recent government support to the 
fossil fuel industry has been the prevention of job losses. 
However, only a few instances of support have been ac-
companied by specific employment stipulations; Turkey, 
for example, provides its direct budget transfer to coal 
mining on a per-worker basis (Resmî Gazete 2020). Gov-
ernments’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis have tended 
to intensify patterns that existed prior to the pandemic: ju-
risdictions that already heavily subsidized the production 
of fossil fuels have tended to provide added support to 
coal, oil, and gas, while those with stronger commitments 
to a transition to clean energy are now using stimulus and 
recovery packages to accelerate this shift. 
Both before and during the COVID-19 crisis, some gov-
ernments have introduced measures to move beyond 
fossil-fuelled development pathways, including reforms 
and limits to fossil fuel consumption or production subsi-
dies (e.g. Argentina, Canada, China, India, and Indonesia), 
bans on new extraction activities (e.g. Costa Rica, France, 
and New Zealand), public finance restrictions (most OECD 
member states), and support for economic diversifica-
tion and just transition (Gerasimchuk et al. 2018; see also 
Chapters 4 and 5). Specifically, as part of their recovery 
and stimulus packages, some major fossil fuel producers, 
such as Australia, China, and Norway, have also begun to 
offer support to technologies that could play key roles in a 
low-carbon future, including electric vehicles, renewable 
energy, and hydrogen (Energy Policy Tracker 2020).
3.3 Conclusions 
Governments have pledged to phase out fossil fuel 
subsidies and to align financial flows with low GHG 
emission development. Yet, government support for fossil 
fuel production is instead on the rise — both before the 
onset of COVID-19 and through pandemic recovery and 
stimulus measures. Producer subsidies increased by 38% 
(USD 15 billion) from 2018 to 2019, and, so far this year, 
governments have pledged at least another USD 22 billion 
to fossil fuel production through their COVID-19 recovery 
packages. They have also suspended environmental regu-
lations, cut taxes, and provided favourable financing in the 
interest of sustaining and increasing production. 
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If unchanged, these trends could lock in additional fossil 
fuel infrastructure for the long term, putting climate 
goals at further risk, as well as the fossil-fuel-dependent 
communities that could be stranded by a low-carbon 
future. By contrast, a planned and deliberate wind-down 
of fossil fuel production will help avoid a more disruptive 
transition from fossil fuels, while green stimulus may offer 
significantly greater long-term economic and employment 
potential (Bhattacharya and Rydge 2020; Garrett-Peltier 
2017; Hepburn et al. 2020).  
Many fossil-fuel-dependent regions, communities, and 
workers currently face significant challenges, as a conse-
quence of the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown measures, 
and the oil price drop. This can make government support 
to fossil fuel production and consumption seem inevita-
ble. But governments and financial institutions have an 
opportunity to reduce economic vulnerabilities and set 
the course for a more just, resilient, and sustainable future 
by introducing conditions that benefit social and environ-
mental goals.  
The opportunity to “build back better” remains strong. As 
the final two chapters show, domestic and international 
efforts to ensure an equitable transition away from fossil 
fuels are a critical step to addressing the climate crisis. 
And there are many policy options available to govern-
ments to begin to transition away from fossil fuel produc-
tion. Embarking on this journey may represent one of the 
most challenging global undertakings of the 21st century, 
but one necessary for securing a more just, sustainable, 
and resilient future.
Figure 3.1
Public money commitments to fossil fuels, and to clean and other energy in COVID-19 recovery efforts in G20 countries, USD billion, as of 
11 November 2020 (Energy Policy Tracker 2020). The Energy Policy Tracker defines fossil fuel commitments as conditional when they are 
accompanied by climate targets or additional emission reduction requirements, and defines clean commitments as conditional when 
they are unspecific about the implementation of appropriate environmental safeguards (see http://energypolicytracker.org). 
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Fostering a just and 
equitable transition 
away from fossil fuel 
production
The COVID-19 pandemic has 
provided a reminder of the 
importance of ensuring that a 
transition away from fossil fuels 
is just and equitable. 
A successful global transition 
requires recognizing that 
countries’ transitional challenges 
differ widely depending on their 
level of dependence on fossil fuel 
production and their capacity to 
support a transition.
Countries that are less 
dependent on fossil fuel 
production and have higher 
capacity are best equipped to 
pursue a rapid, just transition 
away from fossil fuel production. 
However, some of the largest 
fossil fuel producers in this group 
are currently among those 
pursuing major expansions in 
fossil fuel supply.
Countries with limited  
financial and institutional 
capacity face significant 
sustainable development 
challenges that are being further 
exacerbated by the COVID-19 
pandemic and will need 
international support to achieve 
a just and equitable transition.  
All fossil-fuel-producing 
countries have incumbent 
interests that have a stake in 
continued extraction. Policy 
interventions associated with 
good governance, transparency, 
democratic oversight, public 
education, and legal recourse 
can help to overcome political-
economic resistance from  
such actors.
Key Messages
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The COVID-19 pandemic has given us a peek into the 
potential inequity of this transition. The fossil fuel industry 
has been hit hard by the recent global economic disrup-
tion, which came on the heels of an expansion in oil supply 
that was already pushing down oil prices. This has resulted 
in painful social costs across the world, and particularly in 
developing countries. 
In Nigeria, lost oil revenue has driven a 25% cut to gov-
ernment spending, forcing the country deeper into debt 
to pay for its pandemic response and public health costs 
(Olurounbi 2020). Iraq’s salaries and social benefits — 
even more dependent on oil revenues — have been signifi-
cantly reduced as well (Kullab and Abdul-Zahra 2020). And 
Ecuador’s public sector has been severely affected by the 
combined impact of the pandemic and collapse of oil reve-
nue, which has impaired its ability to manage the COVID-19 
crisis (Long 2020).
This all comes on top of existing stresses on energy, indus-
trial, and societal systems, from automation to urbanization 
and globalization. The world is in the middle of multiple 
intersecting transitions — and a transition away from fossil 
fuels presents an added challenge that can amplify the 
uncertainties and compound the risks. At the same time, 
this transition is a climate necessity, and it comes with 
immense opportunities. If undertaken in a just manner (see 
Box 4.1), it offers the potential for alternative high-quality 
jobs, improvements in public health, a re-envisioning of 
urban areas, and a refocusing of economic systems on hu-
man well-being and equitably shared prosperity (Coalition 
for Urban Transitions 2019; ILO 2018; Lelieveld et al. 2019; 
OECD 2019).
Realizing this potential is possible, and it requires recog-
nizing that countries’ transitional challenges differ widely 
depending on their level of dependence on fossil fuel 
production and their capacity to support a transition. 
As shown in Chapter 2, major fossil-fuel-producing coun-
tries, both wealthy and poor, are planning to produce fossil 
fuels at levels that together far exceed those consistent 
with Paris Agreement goals. All countries will ultimately 
need to wind down their production, and a successful 
global transition will need to address the widely varied 
scale of the challenge facing different countries. Some will 
have to take the lead, while others will need international 
support if they are to transition on a timescale consistent 
with the Paris Agreement limits. This chapter illuminates 
the challenges different countries face, and the various 
forms of international support that can enable a global 
wind-down in fossil fuel production in keeping with the 
Paris Agreement temperature limits.
4. Fostering a just and equitable transition away  
from fossil fuel production
Winding down fossil fuel production at a rate compatible with a 1.5°C or well below 2°C global 
warming limit will require a significant societal transformation within a limited timeframe. This raises 
a challenging question: how can such a transition be managed in a way that minimizes social disrup-
tion and ensures just and equitable outcomes? The answers will be as varied as the communities 
and countries in which fossil fuel production is a major social and economic force — from Norway 
to Nigeria, and Angola to Australia.
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Box 4.1 Elements of a just transition  
A “just transition” broadly means supporting the 
workers and communities affected by decarbon-
ization. It means providing job security, training, 
education, and social protection, and putting in place 
coordinated policies and investments to protect the 
most affected and the most vulnerable, all developed 
through an inclusive process of social dialogue. More 
broadly, it recognizes the societal transformation 
that comes with a transition away from fossil fuels — 
and that this transformation must come hand-in-
hand with goals of good jobs, social inclusion, and 
poverty eradication.
Economic diversification is a fundamental part of 
this; countries can make their economies more 
competitive, innovative, and resilient to external 
shocks by diversifying inputs, especially through in-
vestments in human capital and institutions. Climate 
goals require that a transition be rapid, and this can 
make diversification a challenge. But done equitably, 
a transition can help communities that now bear the 
ecological and social costs of extraction (ILO 2015; 
Just Transition Centre 2017; TUDCN & ILO 2018; 
TUDCN & ILO 2018; UNCTAD 2018; UNFCCC 2018).
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4.1 National circumstances and transition 
challenges
Winding down fossil fuel production in line with Paris goals 
will have a range of socio-economic effects, including 
on employment, public revenue, the provision of public 
services, economic activity (including the relative profit-
ability or viability of companies and sectors), public health, 
and the local environment. The specifics of these effects 
— and their implications — will depend on national 
circumstances. In particular, two factors are overwhelm-
ingly important: the extent of the country’s dependence on 
fossil fuel production, and the country’s capacity to avert 
and manage the potential disruptive impacts of a transition 
and absorb the costs (Muttitt and Kartha 2020).18 
Capacity is multi-dimensional, and relates to a country’s 
potential to direct economic, technical, institutional, and 
governance-related resources towards a just transition. 
All of these tend to be correlated with a country’s income. 
Poorer countries invariably possess less of this capacity 
and are less able to absorb the costs of a transition, such 
as those associated with providing workers with a social 
safety net, prematurely retiring capital, and investing in 
establishing new industries. Moreover, such countries 
are confronted by other developmental challenges, such 
as poverty eradication, provision of basic services, and 
investment in basic infrastructure. For this reason, income 
is a useful proxy for comparing various countries’ potential 
to devote their capacities to a transition, and for indicating 
whether it is even possible without financial support. 
Dependence also takes varied forms, and can include, for 
example, dependence on the fossil fuel sector for em-
ployment, reliance on fossil fuel rents for funding public 
services, or the importance of fossil fuel export revenues 
for foreign exchange.   
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the wide spectrum along 
which countries fall in terms of their relative capacity and 
dependence. Figure 4.1 compares the 10 largest coal pro-
ducers in terms of their income per capita (y-axis) and the 
contribution of the coal sector to employment (x-axis).  
It shows, for example, that China is ten times more depen-
18 This is conceptually similar to the observation of Peszko et al. (2020) that countries can be assessed with respect to their exposure and resilience.
Figure 4.1
Coal mining share of employment versus per-capita gross national income (GNI), selected countries, 2015. Size of bubbles reflects 
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dent than Germany on coal mining as a source of employ-
ment (even relative to its population). Figure 4.2 compares 
22 of the largest oil producers, in terms of income per 
capita (y-axis) and the share of public revenue obtained 
from oil (x-axis).  
These two characteristics, dependence and capacity, 
provide a framework for examining transition challenges 
and opportunities in different countries, and considering 
their relative roles in a global effort to wind down fossil 
fuel production. As suggested in Figure 4.3, countries with 
higher capacity (income per capita) to manage and sup-
port a just transition and with lower fossil fuel dependence 
are generally better positioned to more quickly wind down 
their production of fossil fuels. Those countries with higher 
economic and social dependence on fossil fuels — and/
or with limited capacity to fund diversification, retraining, 
and other key elements of transition strategies — will 
need longer to complete the transition. But they will still 
need to undertake a transition at a pace consistent with 
Paris Agreement goals; for this, they will need international 
support of various forms. 
Closely related to dependence and capacity, political 
economy also plays a central role in enabling or impeding 
transitions. As noted in Chapter 1, actors with vested inter-
ests in fossil-fuel-based development are often powerful 
forces that may resist transition-related policies. Just tran-
sition policies can lessen or exacerbate this challenge. For 
example, transition policies that prioritize diversification 
and investment in regions heavily dependent on fossil fuel 
extraction can weaken opposition, and policies that are 
responsive to the needs of workers can win the political 
support of trade unions and local communities.
The following subsections consider the transition chal-
Figure 4.2
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lenges and opportunities — and the potential role for 
international cooperation — for countries in each quad-
rant of Figure 4.3. The aim of our approach is to survey 
the features of a just transition, recognizing that countries’ 
transitional challenges differ considerably depending on 
their relative level of dependence on fossil fuel produc-
tion and the capacity (financial or otherwise) available 
to support a transition. This approach is not, however, 
intended to assign every country neatly into one of the four 
categories. Dependence and capacity are not rigid binary 
distinctions but can be found along a continuum, and there 
is no unique metric for definitively measuring either one. 
Other similar frameworks can also be applied; Peszko et al. 
(2020) is an excellent example, where multiple indicators 
of resilience (similar to capacity) and exposure (akin to 
dependence) led to a typology of countries similar to what 
we present here. 
The approach we describe here can also contribute to  
discussions within the UN climate change process about 
facilitating a just transition. It provides a lens through 
which to view countries’ efforts towards a just transi-
tion — one that is in line with the principles of equity and 
common but differentiated responsibilities enshrined in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement.
Countries’ transitional challenges  
differ considerably depending on their 
relative level of dependence on fossil 
fuel production and the capacity  
(financial or otherwise) available to 
support a transition.
Figure 4.3
How capacity and dependence can influence the pace of winding down fossil fuel production and need for international support. 
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Countries with lower dependence  
and higher capacity  
Countries that have lower dependency on fossil fuel 
production and higher capacity to govern transitions away 
from such production include many of the world’s largest 
fossil fuel producers (e.g., the US, Australia, Canada, 
Norway, Germany, and the UK). These countries derive a 
relatively small share of gross domestic product (GDP) or 
employment from production, because their economies 
are also highly diversified. Some of them have well- 
established institutions and legal structures for labour 
relations, and existing processes for social dialogue. They 
are well primed not only to decarbonize their own econ-
omies — with limited macroeconomic effects and major 
co-benefits (GCEC 2014; Pollin and Callaci 2016; Stern 
2015) — but also to lead the global transition away from 
fossil fuel production. They are best placed to support the 
transitions of lower-capacity countries through financial 
support, technical or financial expertise, policy guidance, 
or by making accommodations in the multilateral regimes 
that govern areas such as trade, investment, and technol-
ogy transfer.
Nevertheless, fossil fuel production even in these coun-
tries is often concentrated in a few subnational regions 
that are highly reliant on associated economic flows, jobs, 
and revenues. A key transition challenge, therefore, is to 
avoid adverse socioeconomic and political impacts in 
the affected subnational regions, which may exacerbate 
existing inter-regional inequalities.
Another general characteristic of these countries is a 
strong rule of law and high public sector capacity to 
implement enacted laws and policies, often including 
well-exercised processes of social dialogue and demo-
cratic participation. However, the capacity to formulate 
and enact the required laws and policies is subject, as in 
other countries, to political economic forces.  
These countries’ fossil fuel industries tend to be owned 
by private investors rather than the state (Bond et al. 
2020). This introduces two general types of challenges to 
timely transitions. First, a low-carbon transition unfolding 
faster than anticipated by the investment community 
could threaten the stability of the financial sector in some 
of these countries (NGFS 2019). Second, firms in the 
sector tend to be highly politically organized, investing 
considerable resources into lobbying, campaign finance, 
public relations, and think tank sponsorship (Jacques 
et al. 2008), and exerting influence through a “revolving 
door” between business and government (Carboni 2017; 
Holley et al. 2019; Huter et al. 2018). This political activity 
is widely considered to be a major barrier to decarbon-
ization (Jacques et al. 2008; Pearse et al. 2013; Downie 
2019; Curran 2020; Mildenberger 2020). To overcome 
these challenges, a transition will require weakening 
these incumbent interests in general (Fouquet 2016; 
Turnheim and Geels 2012), engaging with industry actors 
that are making serious efforts to support transitions, and 
strengthening cooperation with other firms and labour 
unions (Finnegan 2018; Finnegan 2019; Green and Gam-
bhir 2019; Lindvall 2017; Meckling and Nahm 2018). 
With some notable exceptions, these countries are doing 
relatively little at a national level to facilitate an equitable 
wind-down of fossil fuel production. Many countries have 
policies that actively promote fossil fuel production (see 
Chapter 3 and SEI et al. 2019). Indeed, some of the largest 
fossil fuel producers in this group — Australia, Canada, 
and the US — are among those currently pursuing major 
expansions in fossil fuel supply (see Chapter 2 and SEI 
et al. 2019). Moreover, these and other countries have, to 
varying extents, expanded state support to fossil fuel pro-
ducers in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, as noted in 
Chapter 3 (Boyle 2020; Mazenbarg 2020; Offshore 2020; 
Stokes and Mildenberger 2020). 
Most Rapid 
Wind-down
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At the same time, a few countries, such as France, Ger-
many, New Zealand, and Spain have taken steps to limit 
production and support just transitions (Climate Change 
Laws of the World 2017; Farand 2020; Government of 
Spain 2020; New Zealand Parliament 2018; Wettengel 
2020). Most of these countries also have arrangements in 
place to mitigate adverse socioeconomic impacts among 
affected workforces and communities and to support 
equitable transitions more broadly:
j  In Germany, the government’s coal exit plan recom-
mends compensation for affected coal-fired power 
generation companies and employees, and a range of 
measures to diversify and support the economies of 
affected lignite mining regions (BMWi 2019). 
j  The Spanish government in 2018 negotiated a deal 
with unions, which will see EUR 250 million invested in 
coal mining regions through a mix of early retirement 
schemes for miners, ecological restoration of mining 
sites, support for business ventures in green industries, 
and re-skilling of workers for employment in these in-
dustries (MITECO 2018). The new draft Spanish climate 
and energy law includes provisions requiring the ap-
proval of a transition strategy for fossil-fuel-dependent 
communities every five years and envisages the devel-
opment of specific transition agreements to promote 
alternative economic activities in affected areas (Farand 
2020; MITECO 2020). 
j  The Government of New Zealand is supporting a 
transition away from fossil fuels in the country’s main 
offshore oil- and gas-producing region through the 
financing of a clean energy and clean technology re-
search fund and the establishment of a Just Transition 
Unit (MBIE 2018; RNZ 2019).
j  The European Commission's Platform for Coal  
Regions in Transition supports cross-national dialogue 
and capacity building (European Commission 2019), 
and the EU’s 2021–2027 budget will channel funds to 
a newly-established Just Transition Mechanism (Box 
4.2). However, as part of the compromise deal between 
member states, elements of the original Green Deal 
proposal were cut, and the Mechanism’s Just Transition 
Fund budget was reduced from EUR 40 billion to 17.5 
billion (Morgan 2020).
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Countries with higher dependence  
and higher capacity
A small handful of countries with higher capacity to man-
age and fund just transitions are also heavily dependent 
on fossil fuel production — specifically oil and gas — for 
a sizeable fraction of government revenue and economic 
activity. These include Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries (see Table 4.1 below) and Brunei. These econ-
omies are characterized by high shares of worldwide oil 
and gas reserves, production, and exports. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the oil and gas sector contributes 
between 20% and 50% of GDP on average, between  
40% and 90% of total government revenues, and be-
tween 50% and 90% of total exports of GCC countries 
(Krane 2019; Marcel and Mitchell 2006; Ollero et al. 2019). 
Given their high economic reliance on fossil fuel export 
revenues, these countries tend to be highly vulnerable to 
external shocks affecting oil prices, such as the drop in 
demand caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic, and 
any major decline that would result if stringent climate 
mitigation measures were implemented overseas. Thus, 
despite their relatively high financial capacity (as ex-
pressed in GDP per capita), these less diversified coun-
tries may face greater challenges in undertaking their 
transition away from fossil fuels, minimizing economic 
disruption, and ensuring just and equitable outcomes. 
These challenges extend beyond the oil and gas sector 
because governments tend to distribute oil and gas rev-
enues to their citizens through large and well-paid public 
sectors, in which more than half of employed citizens 
work (Ghafar and Gross 2019). Therefore, a decline in the 
oil and gas sector affects employees in other sectors as 
well. Many countries in this group contain large migrant 
workforces with little access to social protections (Alhus-
sein 2020); a transition will also thus have transnational 
impacts, as it would affect the remittances migrants send 
to their home countries (Ratha et al. 2020). A transition 
that is just and equitable would address the impacts on 
these workers and the transnational economic conse-
quences, including through international policy measures 
that provide safety nets, cash assistance, and offsets to 
the expected declines in remittances. 
As in all fossil-fuel-producing countries, political economy 
is important (Al-Sarihi and Mason 2020). Oil and gas pro-
duction in this group of countries is in the hands of state-
owned national oil companies (NOCs). The institutional, 
political, and fiscal lines between the NOCs and their 
respective governments are blurry (Krane 2019; Marcel 
and Mitchell 2006). In these countries, the oil and gas sec-
tor shapes the economy, the political-economic structure, 
and state-society relations. Large proportions of national 
income coming from oil and gas export revenues — which 
are externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments 
(Gray 2011) — are controlled by a small number of pow-
erful actors, with the government as the primary recipient 
(Beblawi 1987). 
Table 4.1
Economic contribution of oil and gas in Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2018. Source: Ollero et al. (2019)




Oil and gas sector, % GDP 18% 54% 41% 47% 43% 30%
Oil and gas revenue, % total revenue 82% 90% 78% 83% 68% 36%
Oil and gas exports, % total exports 47% 94% 74% 88% 80% 58%
Less Rapid 
Wind-down
The Production Gap: 2020 Report     37
A few of these countries have sought to reduce vulnera-
bility by lowering domestic demand for fossil fuels in ways 
that improve fiscal health. For example, in 2018, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) removed long-standing fossil fuel 
subsidies (Boersma and Griffiths 2016), and Saudi Arabia 
increased domestic gasoline prices and linked them with 
international prices (Gasim and Aldubyan 2020). Sau-
di Arabia also took measures to protect lower-income 
households from the price increases, anticipating the 
policy’s potential social impacts (Obaid 2017). 
Most governments have undertaken efforts to diversify 
their economies to reduce their fiscal dependence on 
oil export revenues (Hvidt 2013; Ulrichsen 2016). Histor-
ically, this has often involved moving downstream in the 
domestic oil and gas industry and shifting to energy-in-
tensive industries such as refining and processing. This 
strategy could also arise in response to stringent climate 
policies of fuel importers in the absence of border taxes 
or broader trade sanctions (Ollero et al. 2019). However, 
this conventional mode of diversification does not reduce 
dependence on fossil fuel production (Peszko et al. 2020). 
Especially for highly dependent oil producers, fuller diver-
sification thus takes time. In the mid-1970s, the UAE began 
an effective programme of diversification that built up the 
tourism, finance, and transport sectors; over the subse-
quent 40 years, this reduced the share of oil rents from 
41% to 11% of GDP (World Bank 2020). Despite being a 
country with relatively high capacity, the UAE still needed 
to draw heavily on foreign labour and skills, while institut-
ing bureaucratic and market reforms (Al-Sarihi and Mason 
2020; Alsharif et al. 2017). 
Various kinds of international engagement and coopera-
tion may be needed to enable a more rapid transition in 
countries with high dependence on extraction, even those 
with relatively high financial capacity. Along with technical 
and institutional collaboration, such countries may be 
more willing and able, and ultimately more successful, at 
transitioning away from fossil fuel production with multi-
laterally-agreed accommodations regarding energy mar-
kets, market share, and prices. This type of cooperation 
could help to reduce wide swings in revenues from year 
to year, create a more predictable path for diversification, 
and make it easier to focus on, and allocate resources to, 
a transition.
Box 4.2  A model for international cooperation on just transition?
The EU’s Just Transition Mechanism was created to 
support workers and regions that need to transition, 
and to allocate that support based on each country’s 
dependence and capacity. This international support 
initiative offers a concrete example of just transition 
cooperation in closing the global production gap. 
The Mechanism will set up a dedicated assistance 
facility and provide public funding to mobilize private 
funding to support national just transition plans that 
“give details on needs and measures for economic 
diversification, reskilling and environmental reha-
bilitation” (European Commission 2020b). It will 
distribute finance to affected regions depending on 
(1) the “scale of the transition challenge” confronting 
the country, and (2) the country’s own “capacity to 
finance … and cope with the transition” (EU Monitor 
2020). A Just Transition Platform will enable coun-
tries and stakeholders to share experiences and best 
practices as the process unfolds (European Commis-
sion 2020a).
This mechanism could serve as a model for interna-
tional just transition cooperation that is politically 
viable, effective, and equitable.
Countries with lower dependence  
and lower capacity 
Several developing countries, such as Bolivia, Mozambique, 
and Vietnam, produce fossil fuels, but at volumes that 
mean they are relatively less dependent on such produc-
tion. Many have sizeable fossil fuel resources that have 
not yet been exploited. These resources are often seen, 
at least by some actors within the country, as central to 
their development pathway (Frynas and Buur 2020). They 
may be seen as especially promising for those countries 
confronted by severe energy poverty and other human  
development needs that are compounded by the COVID-19 
pandemic and its associated economic downturn.
In this context, an important question facing these 
countries is whether to further expand domestic fossil 
fuel extraction as they seek to industrialize, strengthen 
their economies, and increase their energy security. The 
attraction, understandably, is the prospect that related 
investments and rents could contribute to government 
budgets, provide funding for social services, create jobs, 
deliver ancillary community benefits, and generate foreign 
exchange. Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 
for instance, foresees revenues being invested in areas 
such as health, roads, education, and sanitation (UNU-IN-
RA 2019). In Angola, revenue from hydrocarbons will be 
going towards infrastructural development and other bud-
getary lines related to health and education. Mozambique 
anticipates that natural resources revenue will supply 
roughly half of its health financing (UNU-INRA 2019).
Extraction can indeed result in some anticipated devel-
opment benefits, but these are by no means assured, 
nor is it guaranteed that adverse impacts will be modest 
and manageable. The extraction and processing of coal, 
oil, and gas can deepen existing inequities and is often 
associated with human rights violations and local eco-
logical damage (Amnesty International 2017; Amnesty 
International India 2016; Rowell et al. 2005). The Oil, Gas, 
and Mining Unit of the World Bank has examined how the 
fossil fuel extraction industry contributes to gender gaps 
in the distribution of assets and risks and noted that “oil 
revenues dramatically multiply the inequality gaps in their 
society… especially between the sexes” (Scott et al. 2013, 
p.2). In countries where conflict is rife and institutions 
of governance are fragile, it is particularly challenging to 
develop natural resources in a way that benefits social 
development. In many countries, it can yield the opposite 
results, prolonging conflict, fuelling corruption, and further 
marginalizing disenfranchised communities (Epstein 2017; 
Harfoot et al. 2018; Ross 2012).  
An extensive body of literature has examined the cir-
cumstances under which fossil fuel exploitation unfolds 
as a resource blessing or a “resource curse” (Ross 2015; 
Stevens et al. 2015), a term that reflects the fact that many 
resource-rich countries may experience worse devel-
opment and economic growth outcomes than countries 
with fewer natural resources (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
Furthermore, the mere discovery of reserves can create 
a “presource curse” by leading countries to engage in 
imprudent borrowing and contracts (Cust and Mihalyi 
2017). Mozambique — where government revenues from 
discovered offshore gas reserves will not materialize until 
the 2030s — is already showing the effects of a pre-
source curse (Frynas and Buur 2020; Orre and Rønning 
2017). Notably, one lesson from the literature is that better 
outcomes are generally achieved when resource develop-
ment proceeds more slowly, taking time to build insti-
tutional knowledge, local capacity, and mechanisms of 
good governance, as was the case in Norway (Karl 1997; 
Stevens et al. 2015). 
However, proceeding slowly also has problems as 
a strategy for fossil fuel development. The limits to 
future extraction implied by the Paris Agreement (see 
Chapter 2), combined with competition from rapidly 
advancing renewable energy technologies, are changing 
the market outlook for coal, oil, and gas. In this context, 
extractive projects, which typically have a 30- or 40-year 
time horizon, may well leave a legacy of stranded assets 
and unmet liabilities (Cust and Mihalyi 2017; Fuhr and 
West 2014). While some European producers are already 
beginning to take this into account by adjusting their 
future price assumptions and bringing greater caution to 
new investments (Grant 2020), stranded assets are often 
not on the policy radar of government planners in the 
developing world (UNU-INRA 2019). 
The risks associated with stranded assets may be even 
higher in developing countries where large multinationals 
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are ill-equipped to negotiate contracts that meet devel-
opment needs, and where fossil fuel assets and rents 
benefit an elite associated with the oil economy. In Africa, 
for instance, only six of the 500+ oil and gas companies 
are African-owned (Matereke 2015). Trading relations 
are often uneven, and investors may threaten litigation 
in countries where governance and institutions are poor, 
effectively socializing risks and privatizing profits (Bonnit-
cha 2017; Johnson et al. 2019; Tienhaara 2018; Tienhaara 
et al. 2020). Furthermore, sub-national governments 
and local communities often have no say in the negoti-
ation of contracts, yet bear the greatest consequences 
of extraction-related pollution and health impacts, as 
well as face the potential stranding of economic and 
social capacity when export markets decline, deposits 
are depleted, and/or multinational companies move out 
(UNCTAD 2019).
It is therefore important that such countries begin to forge 
alternative development pathways that do not heavily 
rely on fossil fuel extraction as a dominant sector of the 
economy. It is also important that wealthier countries sup-
port them in doing so, helping to expand capacities and 
provide investment. This is especially the case given that 
the economies of many low-capacity countries are rela-
tively undiversified, relying heavily on agriculture, specific 
extractive industries, and occasionally tourism. They rarely 
have well-established supply chains across a range of in-
ternationally marketable products, and thus lack access to 
both investment capital and a diverse, skilled workforce. 
As part of an economy-wide diversification strategy, 
renewable energy provides one opportunity to expand 
electricity access, support industrialization, and diversify 
economies beyond fossil fuels. Renewables are now com-
petitive across various settings; in Zambia, for example, 
tariffs for recent solar photovoltaic facilities are less than 
half those of competing coal plants (Henze 2020; UNU-IN-
RA 2019). A rich endowment in minerals (e.g. lithium and 
cobalt) used in low-carbon technologies may also help 
some countries generate the financial resources required 
to transition away from fossil fuel dependence (UNU-INRA 
2019). This would necessitate not only investment capital 
and skills development, but also strengthening the institu-
tions and norms for ensuring safety, health, environmental 
protection, community participation, and labour rights.  
There is no guarantee that this new generation of ener-
gy-related resources — including hydrogen, lithium for 
batteries, and strategic minerals — will be accessible 
under more equitable regimes of trade, investment, or 
intellectual property. A just transition towards a diversified 
economy will require countries to create and maintain 
institutions and practices of good multi-level governance 
and democratic accountability; and to continually invest in 
skills, enterprise development, and efficient, resilient infra-
structure (Caetano et al. 2020; Lahn and Bradley 2016).  
Existing, successful anti-poverty programmes in devel-
oping countries could serve as models for just transition 
initiatives. Examples include public employment pro-
grammes, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act in India, or payment for 
environmental services schemes, such as the Bolsa Verde 
programme in Brazil (ITUC 2018b). Given the need for a 
rapid transition away from fossil fuel production, many 
countries with lower fossil fuel dependence and lower 
capacity may require international support to make such 
programmes possible.
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Countries with higher dependence  
and lower capacity
Finally, there are some countries that have both a higher 
dependence on fossil fuel production and relatively low 
capacity for supporting a transition away from fossil fuel 
production. Highly dependent countries include, for exam-
ple, Angola, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela, which currently 
receive more than 90% of their export revenues from 
fossil fuels (World Bank 2020). Such countries face partic-
ularly challenging transitions and are least able to manage 
the resulting social disruption and costs. 
A major challenge for these countries will be identifying, 
investing in, and growing alternative sources of export rev-
enue and domestic economic activity. In heavily indebt-
ed countries, this revenue makes it possible to service 
foreign debt; consequently, debt forgiveness could make 
a transition away from fossil fuels more viable, provided it 
does not sacrifice access to future finance (Fenton et al. 
2014; Fischer 2019). 
These countries may rely overwhelmingly on royalties and 
other fiscal income from fossil fuel production for a broad 
range of public expenditures, such as investments in 
education, health, and infrastructure for development and 
poverty reduction (Peszko et al. 2018). Therefore, building 
an alternative tax base may be a prerequisite to shifting 
away from fossil fuel production, although doing so quick-
ly is especially challenging.    
Overall, the oil and gas industry is capital-intensive and 
typically represents a relatively small share of jobs in 
major fossil-fuel-producing developing countries (UNCTAD 
2017), though it is a much larger share when oil-revenue-
funded public sector salaries are included, as noted 
above. The picture is different for coal, which employs 
over 7 million people and supports more indirect jobs 
globally (Pai et al. 2020). When a country has very high 
unemployment — such as South Africa, where there are 
about 80,000 jobs in the coal mining sector — even the 
loss of a relatively small share of the national workforce 
could have severe consequences, particularly in 
producing areas (Burton, Caetano, et al. 2018). In addition, 
an inability to fund strong social welfare systems and 
labour market characteristics — such as large informal 
workforces — make it harder for developing countries 
to implement active labour policies for a just transition. 
This is especially the case where labour union influence 
is also on the decline (Glynn et al. 2020), as unions have 
historically played a strong role advocating for worker 
protections and social welfare policies. Failing to involve 
unions in just transition efforts appears to weaken overall 
outcomes (Bruha et al. 2005; Harrahill and Douglas 2019; 
Stanley et al. 2018).
In higher-dependence, lower-capacity countries, a 
powerful barrier to transitioning away from production 
is the strength of the extractives-led growth paradigm, 
combined with the lack of credible alternative socio-eco-
nomic development strategies. Even though norms are 
changing, many multilateral development banks, donor 
agencies, and private investors have historically promoted 
this paradigm, which can be reinforced domestically by 
rent-seeking behaviour and patronage networks (Lahn 
and Bradley 2016; Peck and Chayes 2015). However, fossil 
fuel extraction (especially oil extraction in the context of 
weak governance) has often been associated with poor 
economic performance and high rates of multidimen-
sional poverty, corruption, conflict, and authoritarianism 
(Collier and Goderis 2008; Humphreys et al. 2007; Ross 
1999).  
So far there has been limited discussion in these coun-
tries about a just transition, not least because their focus 
has been on extraction-driven development (Climate 
Transparency 2018a; Kartha et al. 2018). Concepts such 
as “unburnable carbon” and “stranded assets” have also 
had little traction, as concerns about poverty alleviation 
and infrastructure needs have prevailed (Lahn and  
Bradley 2016).
Nevertheless, some countries have started to take initial 
steps. In Colombia, the Ministry of Finances has recog-
nized the risks associated with a decline in global demand 
for coal (MinHacienda 2018). China — with a higher 
capacity for transition than many other countries in this 
grouping — has established an Industrial Special Fund, 
totalling USD 14.5 billion, for employment restructuring in 
coal areas (Bridle et al. 2017). Trade unions and multilat-
eral development banks have initiated policy discussions 
around transitions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America  
(Climate Transparency 2018a; ITUC 2018a). 
Less Rapid Wind-down 
With International 
Support
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South Africa has explicitly referred to a just transition in 
its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) under 
the UN climate process, and has initiated a social dialogue 
process under the country’s National Planning Commis-
sion to develop just transition sustainable development 
pathways (Climate Transparency 2018b). Just transition, 
including support for affected workers, was also explic-
itly mentioned in a roadmap for reforming the electricity 
industry in the country (DPE 2019). The country is now 
developing a funding mechanism, the Just Transition 
Transaction, which aims to mobilize blended finance to 
fund the accelerated phase-out of coal and move towards 
renewable energy. A portion of the concessional funds is 
destined to contribute to a Just Transition Fund, which 
will support workers and communities dependent on coal 
(Winkler et al. 2020).  
Some countries with high dependence and low capacity 
have made economic diversification efforts in the past, in 
the wake of oil price declines and the collapse of ex-
tractive industries. Though not motivated by low-carbon 
transitions, they do provide useful precedents. In the 
1990s, authorities in South Africa’s Free State responded 
to a rapid decline in gold mining by setting up the Free 
State Goldfields Development Centre to support econom-
ic diversification (Atteridge et al. 2020). The Nigerian gov-
ernment has been targeting education and reforming the 
business environment to facilitate youth entrepreneurship 
for economic diversification (OECD and WTO 2019).
Many highly dependent countries will need support of var-
ious types to undertake a just transition away from fossil 
fuel production. Higher-capacity countries can include 
some of this support in their just transition initiatives, 
through programmes to help lower-capacity countries 
with diversifying their economies, reinvesting in communi-
ties, building human capacity, and supporting workers. 
International support can take many forms. Possibilities 
include: changes to international institutions, such as 
those relating to trade, investment, and immigration, to 
provide more policy space to countries seeking to imple-
ment a just transition; technological partnership targeted 
at decarbonization (e.g., targeted low-carbon subsidies) 
and diversification (e.g., green industrial policy); increased 
development assistance to compensate countries where 
reduced extraction would constrain social services; and 
support for migrant workers (Piggot et al. 2018; Rosem-
berg 2010; Rosemberg 2017; UNCTAD 2018). Fossil fuel 
exporters and importers could define and implement car-
bon pricing mechanisms cooperatively so as to allocate 
any surpluses or losses fairly and in a manner that best 
supports a just transition (Peszko et al. 2019). Debt-for-
carbon swaps can be implemented to relieve strains on 
public resources, while providing an incentive for shifting 
away from fossil fuel extraction (Peszko et al. 2019).
4.2 Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic and associated disruptions 
highlight the human costs of heavy reliance on fossil fuel 
production, a vulnerable industry with an uncertain future. 
It also provides an indication of the potential value of 
international coordination in minimizing social costs and 
fostering market stability. At the same time, the global 
economic contraction presents an opportunity for all gov-
ernments to initiate wide-reaching green transformations 
of their economies as part of rescue and recovery efforts 
(Bhattacharya and Rydge 2020; Hepburn et al. 2020). 
As countries shift their focus from rescue towards eco-
nomic recovery measures, numerous initiatives would 
assist in managing the social and economic impacts of 
transition, while narrowing the production gap. Govern-
ments can encourage low-carbon industry and infrastruc-
ture, regulate the fossil fuel industry, provide retraining 
and social protection to fossil fuel workers, and orient 
public and private investment towards strategic sectors. 
International cooperation will be crucial for success. To 
meet Paris Agreement goals, all countries will need to 
wind down fossil fuel production, some more rapidly than 
others. Countries with limited capacity will need finan-
cial, technological, and capacity-building support from 
higher-capacity ones. The EU Green Deal’s Just Transition 
Mechanism, as described in Box 4.2, provides one model 
for such international cooperation on a just and equitable 
transition. Multilateral development banks, which are 
already restricting their financing of fossil fuel projects, 
could also direct more financing to just transition initia-
tives in fossil-fuel-dependent countries and regions that 
invest in human capital and viable economic alternatives 
to extraction. The UN climate change process — which 
has an established programme on economic diversifica-
tion and just transition of the workforce — could also play 
a role in facilitating international cooperation, in keeping 
with its underlying principles of equity.
Such cooperation would be not only ethical; it is also 
practical.
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5
Building back better 
towards a managed 
wind-down of fossil 
fuel production 
1. Ensure COVID-19 recovery 
packages and economic stimulus 
funds support a sustainable 
recovery and avoid further 
carbon lock-in.
2. Provide local and international 
support to fossil-fuel-dependent 
communities and economies for 
diversification and just, equitable 
transitions.
3. Reduce existing government 
support for fossil fuels.
4. Introduce restrictions on fossil 
fuel production activities and 
infrastructure. 
5. Enhance transparency of 
current and future fossil fuel 
production levels.
6. Mobilize and support a 
coordinated global response.
      r ti  :  rt
Key Areas of Action 
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Policies and measures to regulate or manage the wind-
down of fossil fuel production can play an important role 
in promoting policy certainty, avoiding carbon lock-in, 
and reducing the risk of stranded fossil fuel assets — at a 
time where government resources are particularly scarce 
(Chapter 1).
In this chapter, we summarize six main areas of action 
where policymakers can shape a more resilient and 
sustainable future through a managed, just, and equitable 
transition away from fossil fuels. 
1. Ensure COVID-19 recovery packages and economic 
stimulus funds support a sustainable recovery and avoid 
further carbon lock-in. There is a strong case on both 
climate and economic grounds for promoting decar-
bonization as an organizing theme for recovery efforts. 
Renewable energy, building efficiency retrofits, and natural 
capital investments such as afforestation and enhancing 
rural ecosystems, for example, all have high potential to 
combine climate mitigation with job creation (New Climate 
Economy 2018; Hepburn et al. 2020; ILO 2018). By one 
estimate, investments made in renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and mass transit yield three times the number 
of jobs than an equivalent investment in the fossil fuel sec-
tor (Garrett-Peltier 2017; IEA 2020j). At the same time, as 
discussed below, careful planning is needed to ensure the 
communities affected by a transition away from fossil fuels 
benefit from these and other opportunities.
In recognition of the benefits of a low-carbon transition, 
a wide range of officials and organizations have called 
on governments to ensure a green recovery from the 
COVID-19 pandemic (G20 Finance Ministers & Central 
Bank Governors Meeting 2020; IEA 2020m; United 
Nations Secretary-General 2020), and many countries 
have begun to make investments in renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and other related areas (Energy Policy 
Tracker 2020; Table 5.1; Appendix B). However, it is not 
enough to invest government support towards jobs and 
businesses in low-carbon infrastructure and activities. 
If accompanied by significant support for high-carbon 
industries, COVID-19 recovery measures still risk locking in 
high-carbon energy systems and development pathways 
for decades into the future. Governments that invest in 
high-carbon industries to boost economies and safeguard 
livelihoods in the short term — perhaps because they see 
few near-term alternatives — could still consider intro-
ducing conditions that ensure long-term alignment with 
climate goals, and diversification that reduces reliance 
on fossil fuels while ensuring worker protections. While 
some governments have introduced such conditionalities, 
particularly in the aviation and automobile sectors (Energy 
Policy Tracker 2020), the majority of support to the fossil 
fuel industry so far has been unconditional, representing  
a missed opportunity to ensure alignment of support 
packages with climate goals.
2. Provide local and international support to fossil-fu-
el-dependent communities and economies for diversi-
fication and just, equitable transitions. Achieving a just 
and equitable transition away from fossil fuels at a pace 
in line with Paris Agreement goals will require planned 
processes to ensure affected groups are not left be-
hind. Taking such concerns into consideration can also 
build consensus for more ambitious climate policy. It is 
therefore important that governments institute processes 
5. Building back better towards a managed wind-down of 
fossil fuel production 
While governments have already introduced major financial commitments and other measures in 
attempts to boost their economies and protect livelihoods, the work of long-term economic recovery 
from the COVID-19 pandemic has only just begun. Governments can still seize this critical moment to 
“build back better” and support a well-planned transition away from fossil fuel production. 
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to manage an equitable wind-down of existing fossil fuel 
production (Green and Gambhir 2019). Changing market 
dynamics and growing pressures for decarbonization 
make this an opportune moment to initiate planning pro-
cesses to transition economies and regions towards more 
environmentally and economically sustainable industries 
and to consider wide-reaching green transformations 
(Hepburn et al. 2020). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, national and regional govern-
ments around the world face very different challenges 
with regard to achieving a fossil fuel wind-down, as a 
consequence of their different dependencies on fossil 
fuel production and capacities to transition. While there 
is therefore no “one-size-fits-all” approach, inclusive 
planning is widely considered an essential step to ensure 
that fossil-fuel-dependent workers, communities, and 
other affected stakeholders have a say in their changing 
futures (Atteridge and Strambo 2020). In doing so, it is 
important to take into account the wide range of actors 
affected, including workers that face job loss or change, 
as well as businesses that rely on workers in the indus-
try (Zinecker, Gass, et al. 2018). Likewise, policymakers 
should recognize and consider the impacts of a transition 
on energy consumers and the general public, who may 
face challenges related to energy access and potential-
ly increased energy prices (Zinecker, Gass, et al. 2018). 
It is also important to ensure that such processes do 
not exacerbate existing inequalities (Piggot et al. 2019). 
Financial, technical, and capacity-building support for a 
just transition and for economic diversification is vital for 
communities and regions that remain highly dependent on 
fossil fuel production, including in the form of international 
support for countries with limited financial and institution-
al capacity (Chapter 4).
In recent years, several countries and regions have begun 
to develop transition planning processes and programmes 
to support fossil fuel workers as their economies begin 
to shift away from fossil fuels (Table 5.1; Appendix B; see 
also Chapter 4). As discussed in Chapter 4, some of these 
approaches could help to inform models for global coop-
eration in this area. 
3. Reduce existing government support for fossil fuels. 
The current crisis provides the opportunity to reconsider 
many long-standing forms of government support to fossil 
fuels that stand in the way of a sustainable recovery — 
including consumer subsidies, producer subsidies, and 
public finance investment.
While subsidies and other support for fossil fuel produc-
tion have recently been on the rise (OECD 2020b; Chapter 
3), this trend can be reversed by eliminating long-stand-
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ing producer subsidies and ensuring any recent added 
support is short-lived and conditional on alignment of 
activities with climate and other sustainability objectives.
Governments could use the current historically low fossil 
fuel prices — especially for oil and gas— to reduce fossil 
fuel consumer subsidies, freeing up funds that can be 
deployed to more productive and socially desirable ends 
(Moerenhout and Urpelainen 2020). A promising example 
of this are subsidy swaps, whereby some of the savings 
from fossil fuel subsidy reform are reallocated to fund 
a clean energy transition (Bridle et al. 2019). Increasing 
taxation on fossil fuels can similarly support wider societal 
goals, with both India and Costa Rica increasing fuel taxes 
in 2020 to mobilize support for their COVID-19 pandemic 
response (Asamblea Legislativa República de Costa Rica 
2020; Ohri 2020). 
Bridging the production gap may also require national and 
international finance institutions to limit or end support to 
fossil fuel projects, while increasing support for low-car-
bon energy and sectors. Several development banks have 
already begun to shift away from fossil fuel investments 
(Table 5.1; Appendix B; see also Chapter 3). 
4. Introduce restrictions on fossil fuel production 
activities and infrastructure. Restricting new fossil fuel 
exploration, extraction, or export can avoid locking in lev-
els of fossil fuel production higher than those consistent 
with climate goals; it can also reduce the risk of stranded 
assets and communities (Green 2018; Green and Den-
niss 2018; SEI et al. 2019). Examples of relevant policies 
include moratoria, bans, or quotas on fossil fuel produc-
tion activities, or prohibitions or limits on certain fossil fuel 
infrastructure (e.g., oil pipelines or coal ports), or technol-
ogies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing) (Lazarus and van Asselt 
2018; SEI et al. 2019).
Such measures are increasingly seen as viable and 
feasible tools in the climate policy toolkit. Over the past 
decade, various countries have begun to introduce  
restrictions on the production of fossil fuels, including  
Belize (offshore oil), Costa Rica (oil), Denmark (oil, gas, 
and shale gas), France (offshore oil and gas), Ireland (oil), 
and New Zealand (offshore oil and gas) (Danish Energy 
Agency 2018; Government of Belize 2017; Ministère de  
la transition écologique 2017; New Zealand Parliament 
2018; Presidencia de la República de Costa Rica 2019;  
see also Table 5.1 and Appendix B). Ireland and Spain  
have proposed (further) production restrictions — on gas, 
and coal, oil and gas, respectively — in 2020 (Bray 2020; 
MITECO 2020). 
5. Enhance transparency of current and future fossil 
fuel production. A key barrier to aligning energy and 
climate plans is the lack of clarity on levels of coal, oil, 
and gas production and planned or expected growth. 
While governments report to the UN climate process on 
energy use and on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
their trajectories, they are currently neither requested 
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Table 5.1 
Examples of actions that can support a managed wind-down of fossil fuel production. For a more detailed overview, see Appendix B.
Action area Examples
1. Ensure COVID-19 
recovery packages and 
economic stimulus 
funds support a sustain-
able recovery and avoid 
further carbon lock-in
j Many jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, the Republic 
of Korea, and the UK, have designed or proposed recovery packages that support climate 
goals, including through measures supporting green mobility, energy efficiency, and clean 
energy.
2. Provide local and 
international support to 
fossil-fuel-dependent 
communities and econ-
omies for diversification 
and just, equitable 
transitions
j Jurisdictions such as Chile, China, Germany, the EU, South Africa, and Spain have introduced 
just transition plans and/or measures to support affected workers, communities, and regions in 
transitioning away from coal, e.g. through unemployment relief, re-training, and compensation.
j Canada, New Zealand, and Scotland have set up bodies to support governments in designing 
policies that mitigate the social repercussions of the transition away from fossil fuels.
3. Reduce existing  
government support  
for fossil fuels 
j In Canada, Germany, the EU, France, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK, public finance institutions 
have begun to divest away from fossil fuels. 
4. Introduce restrictions 
on fossil fuel production 
activities and infrastruc-
ture
j Bans and moratoria on the exploration of certain fossil fuel resources have been enacted in 
Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Ireland, New Zealand, and Spain, among other countries.
5. Enhance transparency 
of current and future 
fossil fuel production
j Numerous national governments, central banks, regulators as well as hundreds of companies 
and financial firms support the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure guidelines 
for identifying and reporting on how company plans and operations align with Paris Agree-
ment goals (Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 2020). 
6. Mobilize and support 
a coordinated global 
response
j Some multilateral development banks have committed to refrain from financing coal, oil, and/
or gas projects, including the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the 
World Bank Group.
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nor required to report on current and projected fossil fuel 
production. To improve transparency, governments could 
ensure that relevant production data are more readily and 
publicly accessible. 
Governments can also provide information on how their 
fossil fuel production plans align with climate goals. They 
can also provide more clarity on their support to the pro-
duction of fossil fuels, through public finance, subsidies, 
and other measures. Such data, which could be published 
by governments independently, as well as reported under 
the UN climate change process’ transparency framework, 
would allow for better understanding and alignment of 
energy and climate objectives (SEI et al. 2019), and thus 
support efforts to “build back better”.
Governments can also take steps to disclose their level of 
exposure to fossil fuel asset stranding and associated sys-
temic risk, and to require companies within their jurisdic-
tion to do so as well. The Task Force on Climate-Related 
Financial Disclosure, for instance, has provided recom-
mendations for corporations to identify and report on 
how their plans and operation align with Paris Agreement 
climate goals (Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures 2017). In 2020, New Zealand became the first 
country to propose regulations to require the financial 
sector to report on climate risk (Burton 2020).
6. Mobilize and support a coordinated global response. 
Policies to transition away from fossil fuels will be most 
effective if led by countries collectively, as they send the 
directional signals that energy producers, consumers, and 
investors follow. There are a variety of ways that interna-
tional cooperation can support a just and equitable wind-
down of fossil fuels. Under the UN climate change pro-
cess, the global stocktake — scheduled to take place in 
2023 and every five years thereafter — could take stock 
of the extent to which governments and other actors are 
winding down fossil fuel production and support (Piggot 
et al. 2018; SEI et al. 2019). This collective international 
exercise — which could be supported by information 
shared through the UN climate change process’ trans-
parency framework —could also facilitate lesson sharing 
between countries as they adopt policies and actions to 
transition away from fossil fuels (Piggot et al. 2018; SEI et 
al. 2019).
As key tools for communicating climate actions through 
the UN climate change process, nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) and long-term low greenhouse 
gas emission development strategies (LEDS) can play an 
important role in supporting a wind-down of fossil fuel 
production. As countries prepare their LEDS and next 
round of NDCs, they can use these documents to commu-
nicate targets, policies, and pathways to better align fossil 
fuel production with climate goals internationally (Verkuijl 
et al. 2019). The UN climate change process also expects 
developed country Parties to provide financial resources 
to assist developing country Parties with both mitigation 
and adaptation; in this way, it provides important ave-
nues to facilitate financial and technological support and 
capacity building for developing countries to support a 
just transition away from fossil fuels (Piggot et al. 2018; SEI 
et al. 2019). 
Beyond the UN climate process, international financial in-
stitutions can help shift financial support away from fossil 
fuel production while scaling up support for low-carbon 
energy. In recent years, some multilateral development 
banks have begun to make commitments to end support 
for the production of coal, oil, and gas (Table 5.1; Appen-
dix B). In addition, governments can continue to scale up 
international efforts to address subsidies for fossil fuels, 
including through processes such as the G20, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development, and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (SEI et al. 2019).  
Recent research furthermore highlights the potential 
of new forms of international cooperation towards a 
managed wind-down of fossil fuels, including through new 
multilateral clubs or commitments to create “fossil fuel 
free zones” (Green 2018) or a new supply-side or “fossil 
fuel non-proliferation” treaty (Asheim et al. 2019; Newell 
and Simms 2019). 
Conclusion
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to unfold, much 
remains uncertain. One thing, though, is not in doubt: 
a more resilient and sustainable world must be far less 
dependent on fossil fuels, and a managed decline can 
ensure a smoother and more just and equitable transition. 
At this historic juncture, governments face a stark choice. 
Will they continue to bet heavily on the fossil fuel sector, 
bringing risks of both increasingly severe climate impacts 
and an unnecessarily disruptive transition to a low-carbon 
economy? Or will they seize the opportunity to lay down 
just and equitable pathways away from coal, oil, and gas? 
The policy solutions are available. What is required is the 
political will and international cooperation to realize them.
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Australia Resources and Energy Quarterly from  
the Office of the Chief Economist  
(Office of the Chief Economist 2020)
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Canada Canada’s Energy Future: Energy Supply 
 and Demand Projections to 2040  
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China 2050 World and China Energy Outlook 
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General of National Energy Council 2019)
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Examples of actions that can support a managed wind-down of fossil fuel production 
Action area Illustrative examples Source
1. Ensure COVID-19 
recovery packages and 
economic stimulus funds 
support a sustainable re-
covery and avoid further 
carbon lock-in
In Australia, several states are investing in Renewable 
Energy Zones with the goal of developing jobs and in-
novation in clean energy. For example, Queensland has 
invested AUD 145 million (USD 102 million) and New 
South Wales AUD 31.6 million (USD 22.3 million).








The government of Canada has committed up to CAD 
2.47 billion (USD 1.8 billion) towards the clean-up of 
orphaned and abandoned oil and gas wells and the cre-




In China, the government has pledged CNY 100 billion 
(USD 15 billion) to national railway development, and 
has committed to build more battery charging and 





France has committed EUR 30 billion (USD 35 billion) 
for energy efficiency, rail and green technologies and 
EUR 1.5 billion (USD 1.7 billion) for the development of 
zero-emission planes in its COVID-19 recovery package. 
Its EUR 7 billion (USD 8 billion) support package for Air 
France also includes loans that are conditional upon 
emission reductions from certain flights and reduction 
of domestic flights where rail alternatives are available. 
Plan for the ecological transition: https://www.
economie.gouv.fr/plan-de-relance/lance-
ment-plan-relance-3-septembre-2020  






The European Council has proposed directing 30% of 
its EUR 750 billion (USD 883 billion) COVID-19 recovery 
fund and its EUR 1.074 trillion (USD 1.265 trillion) 2021 – 
2027 budget to achieving climate targets. This proposal 
still requires approval by the European Parliament and 
specification in terms of areas of spending. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/me-
dia/45109/210720-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf 
Germany will invest EUR 7 billion (USD 8 billion) to 
support the country’s hydrogen strategy, relying on 
electricity used in offshore wind farms. The government 
is also supporting accelerated conversion to more 





Policy supporting accelerated conversion to 





The government of the Republic of Korea has commit-
ted KRW 608 billion (USD 519 million) to supporting 







The UK has committed GBP 2 billion (USD 2.6 billion) 
for walking and cycling infrastructure and GBP 3 billion 
(USD 3.8 billion) for building efficiency.
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Action area Illustrative examples Source
2. Provide local and interna-
tional support to fossil-fu-
el-dependent communi-
ties and economies for 
diversification and just, 
equitable transitions
Canada has established a Task Force on Just Transi-
tion for Canadian coal power workers and communi-
ties which has issued recommendations for the gov-
ernment. In 2018, the government dedicated CAD 35 
million (USD 26 million) over five years to support skills 
development and economic diversification activities, 
to help workers and communities adapt to Canada’s 







China’s 13th Five-Year Plan for the Coal Industry 
includes just transition support measures such as 
support for workers, unemployment relief and training 
and job placement services (2016-2020).
https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/node/3047
The government of Chile has begun to develop a Just 
Transition Strategy, to be elaborated by 2021. Local 
Action Plans will be set up to assess the needs of coal 
regions, mitigate the socioeconomic repercussions 
of coal-fired power plant closures, and maximize the 
benefits of the transition in affected areas.
https://www.energia.gob.cl/mini-sitio/estrate-
gia-de-transicion-justa-en-energia
The EU’s Just Transition Mechanism offers targeted 
support to regions most affected by the transition. It 
includes a Just Transition Platform providing knowl-
edge, technical and advisory support related to the 








The European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment’s just transition initiative (2020) aims to support 
those whose livelihoods are affected by the transition 
process, and regional economic development.
https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/just-transi-
tion-initiative
The German government’s coal exit plan recommends 
compensation for affected coal-fired power generation 
companies and employees, and a range of measures to 





New Zealand’s “Just Transitions Unit” (est. 2018) 
focuses on supporting regions most dependent on the 
oil and gas industry. 
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employ-
ment/economic-development/just-transition/
Scotland’s Just Transition Commission is examining 
opportunities of decarbonization for achieving a sus-





South Africa has included measures to support a just 
transition in coal areas in a key electricity planning 
document (2019). Since 2019, the country has also 








Spain’s Just Transition plan includes early retirement 
for miners over the age of 48, retraining for green jobs, 
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Examples of actions that can support a managed wind-down of fossil fuel production 
Action area Illustrative examples Source
3. Reduce existing  
government support  
for fossil fuels 
Canada’s export credit agency (Export Development 
Canada) has ended financing for the new development, 
construction, or expansion of thermal coal mines or 
dedicated thermal coal-related infrastructure, and new 
financing to companies for which thermal coal mining 
and/or thermal coal power generation account for 







The European Investment Bank's energy lending policy 
phases out direct and indirect financing of energy 
projects reliant on fossil fuels by 2021. This includes 
upstream oil or gas production, coal mining, and infra-




The French government’s development finance 
institution (Agence Française de Développement) 
abstains from financing projects for the exploration or 
production of coal, or projects exclusively dedicated 
to transporting coal, gas, or oil (conventional or uncon-
ventional) (2019 – 2022).
https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/energy-transi-
tion-strategy-2019-2022
In 2007, Germany committed to phase out  subsidies 




Ireland’s Fossil Fuel Divestment Act 2018 requires the 
Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) to divest from 





Swedfund (Development Finance Institution of the 






The UK’s CDC Group will not make new investments 
– either directly or through a fund – in fossil fuel 
sub-sectors that they have classified as misaligned 
with the Paris Agreement (2020 onwards). The UK 
government has ended overseas aid for thermal coal 







The Association of European Development Finance 
Institutions (EDFI), an association of 15 bilateral 
European development finance institutions that invest 
in the private sector in emerging and frontier markets, 
has committed to immediately ending new coal or fuel 
oil financing, including coal prospecting, exploration, 
mining or processing; oil exploration or production; 
and transport and related infrastructure primarily used 
for coal for power generation, as well as to ending 
most forms of standalone fossil gas exploration and/or 
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Examples of actions that can support a managed wind-down of fossil fuel production 
Action area Illustrative examples Source
4. Introduce restrictions on 
fossil fuel production ac-
tivities and infrastructure
Belize has adopted a moratorium on offshore oil explo-
ration and drilling (2018 onwards).
https://www.elaw.org/petroleum-opera-
tions-maritime-zone-moratorium-act-2017
Bulgaria has adopted a ban on shale gas exploration 
and production, and a conditional ban on the applica-






Canada has adopted a moratorium on offshore oil  
and gas activities in Arctic waters (building off a  
moratorium on issuing new oil and gas licenses an-
nounced in 2016, and to be reviewed every five years) 
(2019 – 2021). It has also banned oil and gas activities 





Costa Rica has adopted a moratorium on oil explora-




Denmark has banned exploration and drilling for oil, 






France no longer issues new or renews exploration 
permits for conventional and unconventional fossil 
fuels and will phase out all oil and gas production 




Ireland prohibits exploration for and extraction of 
onshore petroleum by hydraulic fracturing (2017 







Mexico prohibits hydrocarbon exploration and 







The Netherlands has banned shale gas exploration 
(2013 onwards) and is expected to complete the phas-
ing out of gas extraction in the province of Groningen 











New Zealand has banned new offshore oil and gas 
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Examples of actions that can support a managed wind-down of fossil fuel production 
Action area Illustrative examples Source
4. 
(cont.)
Introduce restrictions  
on fossil fuel production 
activities and infrastruc-
ture (cont.)
Norway has closed certain offshore areas for drilling 
including the Lofoten archipelago, other coastal and 
sensitive areas, and in the Arctic (2005 onwards, 




The US has imposed a moratorium on oil and gas ex-





Uruguay has issued a four-year moratorium on hydrau-
lic fracturing (2018 – 2021).
https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/
leyes/19585-2017
5. Enhance transparency of 
current and future fossil 
fuel production 
Numerous national governments, central banks, regu-
lators as well as hundreds of companies and financial 
firms support the Task Force on Climate-Related 
Financial Disclosure guidelines for identifying and 
reporting on how company plans and operations align 




6. Mobilize and support 
a coordinated global 
response
The African Development Bank will not finance oil and 




The Asian Development Bank will not finance oil and 
gas exploration. It will not fund oil field development 
projects, but will consider supporting the development 
of “marginal and already proven” fields if considered 
economically sound. It will not directly finance coal 




The European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment will not finance thermal coal mining or coal-fired 
electricity generation capacity, any upstream oil explo-
ration, or upstream oil development projects except 
in “rare and exceptional” circumstances, where the 
projects reduce GHG emissions or flaring (2018 policy; 




Per above, the European Investment Bank is ending 
virtually all financing for fossil fuel energy projects 




The World Bank Group will only finance coal mining 
in “rare circumstances” (2013 policy). In addition, the 
Group will not provide direct financing for upstream 
(exploration and production of) oil and gas after 2019 
(in exceptional circumstances, consideration will be 








Based on data (including currency conversion rates) and online sources as of mid-September 2020 with additional measures added after the November 2020 Finance in  
Common Summit.

Learn more at  
www.productiongap.org
